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ABSTRACT
The rst chapter co-authored with Tatiana Damjanovic studies optimal mon-
etary policy in a New Keynesian model at the zero bound interest rate where
households use cash alongside house equity borrowing to conduct transactions.
The amount of borrowing is limited by a collateral constraint. When either the
loan to value ratio declines or house prices fall, we observe a decrease in the money
multiplier. We argue that the central bank should respond to the fall in the money
multiplier and therefore to the reduction in house prices or the loan to collateral
value ratio. We also nd that optimal monetary policy generates a large and per-
sistent fall in the money multiplier in response to the drop in the loan to collateral
value ratio.
The second chapter is focused on a macroeconomic model with sticky prices,
rmsborrowing market and the labour market frictions. We study connection be-
tween monetary policy and labour market under the negative nancial and the
positive productivity shocks. We have found that the interest rate rule with ina-
tion and labour market targeting performs better than the rules with the aggregate
consumption and debt targeting and is closest to the optimal policy as compared
to the other regimes in terms of the welfare measure. We demonstrate too that
the sign of the coe¢ cient next to unemployment in the policy rule depends on the
value of workers bargaining power.
The third chapter co-authored with Tatiana Damjanovic and Keqing Liu uses
the classical cobweb model framework to investigate properties of the transition
matrix in the bounded memory econometric OLS-type learning. We dene memory
length as the number of past observations used to form a forecast and analytically
prove that for any length, the eigenvalues of the transition matrix lie within the unit
circle. In addition, we sketch the proof of stationarity of the cobweb model under
3
bounded memory learning. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between
the volatility of forecasts and the length of memory and nd that shorter memory
causes higher variance in both forecasts and estimates of the OLS parameters.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the second chapter of this thesis (already published in Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control), motivated by the empirical evidence of the fall in house-
holds borrowing in the UK after the economic crisis in 2008 (shown in Figure 1.1.),
we investigate the relationship between private credit and monetary policy under
a negative nancial market shock and a positive cost-push shock.
Figure 1.1. Individual Borrowing in the UK
It is worth noting that in the model we assume 100% house ownership. However,
as we can see from gure 1.2 it is not the case in England and Wales where
house ownership was only 69% at its peak in 2001. At the same year households
borrowing also was at its highest value as it is shown in gure 1.1. To make our
model more tractable we assume that all the houses in the economy are owned
by the agents. In the future research we would like to relax this assumption
to investigate what impact does partial ownership might have on the dynamic
properties of the model.
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Figure 1.2. Individual Houses Ownership in England and Wales
As it could be seen from Figure 1.1, the level of total consumer lending (loans)
has dropped signicantly around the year 2008 in the UK. We ask whether central
bank should take into account loan to value (LTV) ratio for households when
designing monetary policy.
We nd that when LTV ratio declines, central bank can stabilize the economy
by reducing interest rate according to the policy rule that includes households
borrowing. When the drop in LTV is too large and interest rate hits ZLB, the
government has to impliment transfers policy.
The motivation for this assumption is clear: both in the US and in the UK
Central Banks had kept interest rate at zero (to be precise, the current rate of the
Bank of England is 0:5%, often referred to as the lowest e¢ cient value of interest)
to ignite the economic growth. When the interest rate is at the ZLB, central bank
can use other policy instrument - transfers - to conduct monetary policy. In some
sense transfers in this case could be seen as a negative taxation, because it enters
households budget constraint directly. However, for the sake of simplicity we use
the term Quantitative Easingto denote the transfers rule. It is worth noting, that
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this is a huge simplication because Quantitative Easing was not implemented in
this way for example in the UK or the US. As mentioned before this simplication
helps to focus our attention on the transmission channel of the newly issued money.
Our results are in favor of including the LTV ratio in the policy rule in both
cases of interest rate. That is, when interest rate has some small positive value and
nancial market collapses, Central Bank by taking into account LTV can adjust
the interest rate in such a way that the economy will be perfectly stabilized in
terms of ination and output uctuations. In the case of ZLB, policy maker can
again perfectly stabilize the economy if the transfers rule is dened by taking into
account the LTV ratio. Further to it, we show that this rule results in the highest
value of the welfare measure and hence it is the optimal response to the negative
credit market shock.
We have also considered the case when the economy is at the ZLB and the
positive cost-push shock occurs. We have found that the policy maker cannot
avoid ination and output deviations from their steady state values, but he can
stabilize relative price of collateral by setting transfers rule to zero. The purpose
and key ndings of the second chapter are summarized below.
Research Question: Should central bank react to the changes in the house-
holds borrowing and if so, what is the optimal reaction in terms of the welfare
measure?
Key Findings: When the economy is at the ZLB, central bank should take
into account changes in householdsborrowing whilst designing the optimal trans-
fers rule, when the economy is not at the ZLB, central bank should take into
account householdsborrowing rule while setting interest rate. In both of these
cases reaction to the changes in borrowing is optimal.
In the third chapter of the thesis we investigate the relation between nan-
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cial and labor markets. That is, we are seeking to nd out if a fall in the rms
borrowing could increase unemployment and if so, through which channel. The
motivation for such research question comes from the fact that after the crisis in
2008 unemployment reached the highest level in almost 20 years (at least in the
UK) and rms borrowing has dropped signicantly. More detailed discussion and
gures illustrating the drop in rms borrowing and increase in unemployment are
provided in chapter 3.
We set up a standard New-Keynesian macroeconomic model with nancial and
labor market frictions to investigate through which channel the fall in rms credit
market could result in the increase in the aggregate level of unemployment. We
have also analyzed possible monetary policy reactions to the negative productivity
shock.
We have found that the Taylor-type interest rate rule with response to ination
and unemployment is the closest one to the optimal policy in terms of the welfare
measure. It is consistent with the previous literature, for instance Faia (2008 or
2008a). Further to this, we nd that the sign next to the unemployment response
parameter in the policy rule depends on the strength of the workers bargaining
power. The reason for it is intuitive: if workers have a lot of bargaining power they
can negotiate a large part of the rms prot in the form of wage and thus rms
ability to borrow by using its expected future prot as a collateral deteriorates.
Therefore policy maker in order to counteract this negative e¤ect reduces interest
rate much more (that is, reacts negatively to unemployment) than in the case of a
low value of workers bargaining.
This paper has two policy implications. Firstly, it provides some justication
for the increased concern of policy makers towards the unemployment targeting
(for instance, Bank of England of Federal Reserve). The reason why unemployment
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targeting is benecial could be summed up as follows: the greatest instability in
the model comes from the labor market uctuations and ination (price stickiness)
therefore the rule which reacts on both of these variables is closest to the optimal
policy as it is shown in Faia (2008).
Secondly, we nd that the drop in rms borrowing market could increase the
level of unemployment by reducing the aggregate demand. That is, in our model
rms borrow to pay the wage for workers. If for some unknown reason lenders
reduce the amount of credit, rms are forced to lay o¤ workers and as result
unemployment increases. This is reinforced by the drop in demand since workers
have less money to nance their consumption. As it was mentioned earlier, in
this case the policy maker could step in and use Taylor-type interest rate rule to
counteract the drop in unemployment.
Research Question: Which Taylor-type policy rule is the closest one to the
optimal policy in terms of welfare measure in the model with labor and credit
market frictions?
Key Findings: Our model, motivated by the empirical evidence, suggests
that we can indeed explain the rise in the aggregate level of unemployment by
looking at the changes in the rms nancial market. Furthermore, Taylor-type
interest rate rule that reacts to unemployment and ination is the closest one to
the optimal policy in terms of the welfare measure. Lastly, we nd that the sign
of the unemployment reaction parameter in the interest rate rule depends on the
workers bargaining power.
In the last chapter of the thesis we investigate econometric learning with
bounded memory which is dened as the agents ability to use only some par-
ticular number T of past observations (instead of the whole sample) to form their
forecasts. The main di¤erence between our approach and the one presented in
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the previous literature (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003, Evans and Honkapohja 2003
to name a few) is the fact that we do not use the recursive formulation of the
learning algorithm with either exponentially decaying
 
1
t

or constant weight as in
Recursive Least Squares (RLS) or Constant Gain (CG) learning. Instead we make
use of the standard non-recursive OLS algorithm and set weight of 1 on the each
of observations that lie within the length of memory T and 0 on all the other ob-
servation. In pure econometric terms, bounded memory learning could be seen as
a rolling window estimate with the window length set to T: This approach allows
us to investigate the impact of length of memory T on the dynamic properties of
the economic model.
Our results show that for any memory length T , the transition matrix of the
learning algorithm has eigenvalues that lie within the unit circle. We use this
nding to sketch the proof of stationarity of bounded memory learning. Using
computational methods have shown too that the mean and variance of the actual
price are nite and equal to rational expectations equilibrium. However, at this
stage we were not able to obtain the analytical proof for such results regarding
mean and variance.
It is interesting to note, that we have also discovered that bounded memory
causes cycles. That is, short memory results in stronger cycles and long memory
tends to reduce the strength of the cycles but increases its length. The reason for
it is intuitive. As agents can use more information (longer T ), they have more
information and hence their forecasts are more accurate. In the short memory
case, agents have much less information and hence they are not able to predict
the price level very well. Furthermore, when memory is short the arrival of a
new information has much more impact than in the case of long memory. We use
discrete Fourier transform to measure the cyclicality of the model.
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Bounded memory learning, economically speaking, could be interpreted as fol-
lows: agents, as time passes, add one more and remove the last observation from
their sample which has the same size as their memory. This could be seen as agents
inability to use all the available information for forecasting prices which results in
cycles of the parameter estimates that in turn imply cycles in the variables in the
model. Moreover, we believe that letting agents have bounded memory is more
realistic than employing the assumption of ever-expanding memory.
Research Question: What are the properties of the bounded memory econo-
metric learning in the cobweb model setting?
Key Findings: Eigenvalues of the transition matrix lie within the unit circle
for any length of memory. Actual price and expected price have the nite mean.
Results from the computational exercise suggest that the mean of the actual price
and parameter estimates of the bounded memory learning are equal to the rational
expectations values.
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CHAPTER 2
QUANTITATIVE EASING AND THE LOAN TO COLLATERAL
VALUE RATIO
2.1 Introduction
During the recent economic crisis credit availability has signicantly decreased
(Dell Ariccia at al., 2008), house prices and output has fallen sharply. Responding
to worsening credit conditions, many developed countries signicantly expanded
their monetary bases. Several central banks engaged in quantitative easing (QE)
taking unconventionalassets onto their balance sheets (Gambacorta at al., 2012).
In this paper, we provide a justication for QE and argue that monetary expansion
is necessary for stabilizing price and output uctuations when there is a marked
tightening of credit conditions.
The general idea of connecting nancial markets and business cycles can be
traced back to Fisher (1933), Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
who show that a contraction in the nancial sector can lead to an economic slow-
down. In this paper, we investigate whether, to what extent and how the monetary
authorities should respond to worsening nancial conditions in order to avoid an
economic recession.
This question is not new to the academic literature.1 On the one hand, in
his review of recent monetary policy developments, Clarida (2012) argues that
nancial variables are not target variables and should not be included in monetary
policy rules. The same opinion is also shared by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and
Iacoviello (2005) who claim that the government should not react to changes in
asset prices as this does not improve the economy in terms of ination and output
1For a comprehensive survey on macroeconomics with nancial frictions, see Brunnermeier et
al. (2012).
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stabilization.
On the other hand, Mishkin (2011) argues that after the 2007-2009 economic
crisis, monetary policy makers understood that the nancial sector has a con-
siderably greater impact on economic activity than has previously been realized.
Further to this, Svensson (2009) recognizes that credit capacity and asset prices
may have a potentially negative impact on ination and resource utilization and,
therefore, including them in the monetary policy rule is entirely consistent with
the stabilization of ination and output gaps. We will also observe this particular
feature in our model.
We study optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with sticky
prices where households use cash alongside equity borrowing to conduct transac-
tions. The amount of borrowing is limited by a collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) or Iacoviello (2005). We simply assume that competitive nan-
cial intermediaries can costlessly create as much credit as they want. However, due
to the lack of contract enforcement, each loan has to be collateralized.
We follow Iacoviello (2005) and Midrigan and Philippon (2011) and assume
that households use houses as collateral. The households credit capacity can
deteriorate for two reasons: a reduction in collateral value or an exogenous shock
which causes a decline in the average recovery rate of collateral. In the remainder
of the paper, this is referred to as a "credit shock". When the loan to collateral
value (LTV) declines, the credit capacity falls. Less inside money reduces nominal
expenditure and, thus, nominal demand. In a exible price economy, producers
adjust their prices accordingly and recession is avoided. However, when prices are
sticky, only incomplete adjustment is possible, and credit tightening results in both
deation and recession, unless an expansionary monetary policy is implemented.
The principal di¤erence of our model to Iacoviello (2005), Monacelli (2009)
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and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) is our assumption that the economy may reach
a liquidity trap. When the interest rate is at its zero lower bound, the monetary
authorities cannot reduce it any further and are hence forced to stimulate the
economy by providing direct monetary transfers to households. Unconventional
monetary expansion at a zero bound interest rate has been advocated by Friedman
(2000, 2006) and Bernanke at al. (2004). When the interest rate is at zero bound,
direct monetary targeting cannot be criticized in the sense of McCallum (1985),
because it does not cause any volatility in the short-term interest rate. To our
knowledge, direct monetary expansion when the interest rate is at its zero lower
bound (ZLB) has not been formally modeled and it is not considered in recent
academic publications (see Adam and Billi, 2007; Coibion, Gorodnichenko and
Wieland, 2012). The only exception, perhaps, is the recent paper by Benigno
and Nistico (2013), which studies a similar shock to us and gives similar policy
recommendations.
We also nd that monetary policy can ensure perfect stabilization of output
and prices when a credit shock hits the economy. When the shock is small, the
monetary policy maker can reduce the interest rate. However, a large negative
credit shock can drive the interest rate to the ZLB. At that point monetary policy
has to inject liquidity into the system.
The expansion of the monetary base in response to the deterioration in credit
availability is necessary because of the fall in the money multiplier. The impor-
tance of the money multiplier has been discussed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988),
Freeman and Kydland (2000) and recently in Goodhart (2009) and Abrams (2011).
Since the money multiplier reects monetary transmission, optimal monetary pol-
icy should respond to changes in it. Our model shows how the multiplier depends
on the LTV ratio and the relative price of collateral. Hence, if houses are used as
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collateral, monetary policy should respond to changes in house prices.
To evaluate monetary policy rules at the ZLB, we construct a second-order ap-
proximation as in Benigno and Woodford (2012)2 and obtain a social loss function
as in the conventional New Keynesian model (Benigno and Woodford, 2005). In
our model, optimal monetary policy generates the same impulse responses to the
cost-push shock for output and ination as in the standard New Keynesian model.
In order to achieve optimal dynamics, central bank should conduct monetary ex-
pansion when there is a fall in the LTV ratio or if the relative price of collateral
declines.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we present the model and
dene dynamic equations for the economy. In Section 2.3, we discuss optimal mon-
etary policy and some other policy issues. We include a short discussion of what
may happen if central bank ignores changes in the credit constraint or uctuations
in house prices. We also underline the importance of the money multiplier and
its connection to credit constraints and the relative price of collateral. In Section
2.4 we provide a short discussion of the factors which can a¤ect the LTV ratio.
In Section 2.5 we investigate an economy when money and loans are not perfect
substitutes. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Model
In this section, we present a stylized New Keynesian economy with collateral con-
straint. Our model consists of several ingredients. First, we have households who
consume nal goods, provide labor to nal good producers, earn wages, share the
prot of the rms and take loans against collateral. Second, there are intermediate
and nal goods producers. The latter operate in a sticky price environment in the
2See also Levine at al. (2008).
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spirit of Calvo (1980). There are also monetary authorities which make decisions
about interest rate and money supply.
Finally, we have a nancial sector which creates inside money through lending.
We simply assume that a nancial intermediary can costlessly create as much loans
as is safe. That is a principal di¤erence of our model compared to Benigno and
Nistico (2013) or Iacoviello (2005), where nancial intermediaries do not participate
in the creation of inside money. To hedge against the risk of default, the lender
issues debt against valuable collateral, represented by houses in our model. If
borrowers repudiate their debt, the lender can repossess the borrowersassets and
recover a xed proportion of their value. The only interesting outcome of nancial
intermediation for our model is the loan to value ratio. Micro modelling of the
nancial sector could explain/endogenise LTV. However, for simplicity, we treat it
as exogenous but stochastic.
2.2.1 Households
A representative household has a utility function that includes the consumption
of goods, Yt; valuable collateral (house), ht; and labor, Lt,
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
tu(Yt; ht; Lt) = Et
1P
t=0
t

log Yt +  log ht    L
v+1
t
v + 1

; (2.1)
where v is the labor supply elasticity parameter,  captures individual household
preferences towards units of housing and  denes the value of leisure.
For their transactions, households can use cash, i.e. outside money, Mt; and
the money created by the banking system, i.e. inside money, Bt. The broad money
can be used to buy consumption goods and invest in collateral
PtYt +Qt(ht   ht 1) Mt +Bt; (2.2)
where Pt is the price of nal goods, Qt is the price of collateral, and ht   ht 1 is
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investment in collateral. This is cash-in-advance constraint where credit has to be
collateralized by housing. It is very similar to Lucas and Stokey (1987) setup.
The amount of private credit is subject to a collateral constraint
Bt  tQtht; (2.3)
which implies that households cannot borrow more than a fraction t of their col-
lateral value Qtht. Parameter t denotes the tightness of the borrowing constraint.
A smaller value of t implies a smaller loan size, whereas a high value means that
a household may obtain a relatively large loan. The government implements mon-
etary policy by printing new bills and distributing them across households as a
lump-sum transfer
M st = Mt 1 + Tt: (2.4)
The loan must be repaid immediately after households obtain their wage and div-
idend income. Let Wt be the nominal wage and t be the prot of rms owned by
households and paid in the form of dividends. Then, at the end of the period, the
liquidity position of the household is
Mdt = WtLt + t + Tt   (1 + rt 1)Bt 1: (2.5)
Households Optimization
In the appendix, we show that maximization of household utility (3.1) subject to
constraints (2.2, 2.3 and 2.5) results in the following Euler equation
U 0ht + t
Qt
Pt

U 0ct   EtU 0ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + rt)

= U 0ct
Qt
Pt
  EtU 0ct+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
: (2.6)
The left-hand side of the equation shows the marginal benet from an extra
unit of collateral: it consists of a direct boost to utility, U 0ht; as well as an e¤ect
due to the possibility of using collateral to secure a loan. The value of the second
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source is proportional to credit tightness t. In other words, a smaller t reduces
the loan size and, as a result, there is a fall in the benets from using a house as
a collateral .
Moreover, constraint (2.2) is always binding, while constraint (2.3) is binding
when
U 0ct   EtU 0ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + rt) > 0: (2.7)
In a deterministic steady state the credit constraint will be binding if and only if
 (1+rt)
t+1
< 1: As we see, either a reduction of the borrowing rate or an increase in
ination can move the economy from the state when the credit constraint is not
important to the state when it is binding. In our main presentation we assume
the interest rate to be at the zero bound, rt = 0. In this case, if the price level
and the consumption level are stable, inequality (2.7) is satised. Following Ia-
coviello (2005), we will consider that the uncertainty is "small enough" to preserve
inequality (2.7).
Using the particular functional form of utility (3.1), the assumption of the zero
interest rate, and normalizing the units of housing, ht = 1, we transform equation
(2.6) into the following form
 + Et [qt+1] =

1  t

1  Et (1 + rt)

PtYt
Pt+1Yt+1

qt; (2.8)
where qt is relative housing expenditure, which is dened as
qt =
Qtht
Ptct
:
Finally, the rst-order condition with respect to Lt denes labor supply
 U
0
L(Ct; Lt)
U 0C(Ct; Lt)
= LvtYt =
Wt
Pt
: (2.9)
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2.2.2 Final Good Producers
We assume that nal good producers take intermediary goods and sells it to house-
holds in the sticky prices environment. Furthermore, intermediary goods producers
operate in the perfectly competitive market. Aggregated nal good, denoted as
Y ft could be dened as
Y ft =
Z 1
0
y"t (i)di
 1
"
(2.10)
We assume that nal goods are imperfect substitutes and that consumption is
dened over the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) basket of goods, Y ft =
hR 1
0
Yt(i)
" 1
" di
i "
" 1
:
The average price-level, Pt, is known to be Pt =
hR 1
0
pt(i)
1 "di
i 1
1 "
. The demand
for each good is given by Yt(i) =

pt(i)
Pt
 "
Y ft ; where pt(i) is the nominal price
of the nal good produced in industry i and Yt denotes aggregate demand. Each
good is produced according to a linear technology using labor as the only input,
Yt(i) = Lt(i):
There is an economy-wide labor market so that all rms pay the same wage for
the same labor, wt(i) = wt; 8i: All households provide the same share of labor to
all rms, so that the total labor supply in (3.1) is dened as Lt =
R 1
0
Lt(i)di; which
in combination with the production function and demand relates output to labor
income. Lt =
R
Lt(i)di = Yt
R Pt(i)
Pt
 "
di = Ytt; wheret is the measure of price
dispersion: t 
R 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
di: The real wage, wt = WtPt ; is then wt = Y
v+1
t 
v
t :
Price Setting of a Representative Firm
We will model price stickiness according to Calvo (1983). A xed proportion of
rms adjusts prices in each period. These rms choose the nominal price which
maximizes their expected prot given that they have to charge the same price
in k time periods with probability k. The real prot can be written as (i) =
pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i)   twtLt(i); where t is a cost-push shock. We assume that rms are
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price takers and cannot a¤ect any aggregate variables. Let p0t denote the choice
of the nominal price by a rm that is permitted to re-price in period t. Then the
rms objective is to choose p0t to maximize the following sum
maxEt
1X
k=0
kk
"
p0t
Pt+k

p0t
Pt+k
 "
Yt+k   twt

p0t
Pt+k
 "
Yt+k
#
: (2.11)
The rst-order condition implies
p0t
Pt

=
 
"
" 1

Et
P1
k=0()
k

t+kwt+kYt+k(Pt=Pt+k)
 "
Et
P1
k=0()
k(Pt=Pt+k)1 "Yt+k
: (2.12)
It is useful to introduce new variables, Xt and Zt; for the discounted expected real
revenue and costs of the rm:We dene them asXt = Et
P1
k=0()
k(Pt=Pt+k)
1 "Yt+k,
Zt = Et
P1
k=0()
k

t+kwt+kYt+k(Pt=Pt+k)
 " : The price index will evolve accord-
ing to the following law of motion, Pt =

(1  ) p1 "t + P 1 "t 1
 1
1 " ; which can be
rewritten as p
0
t
Pt
=
h
1 " 1t
1 
i 1
1 "
:
2.2.3 Governments Optimization Problem
The policy maker maximizes the households utility function with the awareness
that the supply of houses is constant and normalized to 1, ht = 1,
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
t

log Yt   Y
v+1
t 
v+1
t
v + 1

; (2.13)
subject to a set of constraints imposed by private agents behavior (2.14-2.21),
where a block of three equations (2.15-2.17) represents formula (2.12) in a VAR
form and (2.18) is the law of motion for the measure of price dispersion.
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 + Et [qt+1] =

1  t

1  Et (1 + rt)

Yt
t+1Yt+1

qt; (2.14)
Xt = Yt+aEt
" 1
t+1Xt+1; (2.15)
Zt = tY
v+2
t 
v
t+aEt
"
t+1Zt+1; (2.16)
Xt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
=
"
"  1Zt; (2.17)
t = t 1"t+ (1  )

1  " 1t
1  a
 "
" 1
; (2.18)
Mt
PtYt
= 1  tqt; (2.19)
Tt = Mt M t 1; (2.20)
t =
Pt
Pt 1
: (2.21)
As in Midrigan and Philippon (2011), we obtain that, in the steady-state out-
put, Y; does not depend on the credit constraint, : However, the value of  will
positively a¤ect relative housing expenditure, q = 
(1 )(1 ) and, therefore, equi-
librium real house price Q
P
= qY: It will also dene the broad money multiplier,
m = M+B
M
: Since broad money, Mt +Bt; equals total expenditure, we can compute
the money multiplier from (2.19)
mt =
Mt +Bt
Mt
=
PtYt
Mt
=
1
1  tqt : (2.22)
This positive relation between the money multiplier, mt, the credit constraint, t;
and the relative collateral value, qt, will drive our results.
2.2.4 Negative Credit Shock and ZLB
When a small negative credit shock hits an economy, the monetary authority can
easily mitigate it by reducing the interest rate with or without applying direct
monetary transfers. Consider a simple case when an economy is initially in an
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optimal steady state. Suddenly, the Loan to Value ratio, ; declines. If the interest
rate rate is positive and the credit shock is relatively small, the government can
use conventional interest rate policy only, without providing monetary transfers.
Precisely, we formulate it in the following proposition
Proposition 2.2.1 When interest rate is positive, rt > 1; and the negative credit
shock is small, there exists such stabilization policy that Tt = Tt+1 = 0, t = t+1 =
1;Yt+1 = Yt = Yt 1: That policy implies the following dynamics for interest rate
rt = rt 1   1


1
t
  1
t 1

 

Et 1
1
t
  Et 1
t+1

(2.23)
Proof. See appendix.
The exact amount of the interest rate reduction depends on three factors: i)
the direct negative e¤ect from the di¤erence in inverse LTV ratio, 1


1
t
  1
t 1

;
ii) the surprise e¤ect or the di¤erence between actual and expected value st =
( 1
t
  Et 1 1t ); and iii) the expected change, et =

Et
1
t+1
  1
t

rt = rt 1   1


1
t
  1
t 1

+ st + et: (2.24)
For example, in an extremely myopic case when the fall in LTV is completely
unexpected, Et 1 1t =
1
t 1
; the surprise e¤ect is big, st = 1t   1t 1 ; however it
is smaller than a negative direct e¤ect. In a less extreme case the surprise e¤ect
should be smaller. The expectation e¤ect depends on how permanent the fall in
LTV is expected to be. Consider the extreme case when the public expects the
LTV to return back to its original value, Et 1t+1 =
1
t 1
: In this case the expectation
and surprise e¤ects cancel each other and the optimal change in interest is
rt = rt 1   1


1
t
  1
t 1

: (2.25)
While policy (2.23) stabilizes the economy perfectly, it is subject to the zero
lower bound constraint on interest. Consider case (2.25) with the data of Sep-
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tember 2008. The LTV ratio before the subprime mortgage crisis was above 95%,
and then it sudden dropped below 85%. According to (2.25) the corresponding
reduction of the interest rate would exceed 12%. However, the pre-crisis interest
rate was below 5% and the optimal reduction was impossible without hitting the
zero lower bound.
When the fall of the LTV is signicant the interest rate adjustment can be insuf-
cient to stabilize the economy due to the ZLB constraint. In that case, additional
expansionary monetary policy is required through non-conventioanl methods.
In the next section we will show that the monetary authorities can mitigate a
negative credit shock with direct monetary expansion, Tt > 0. The conventional
interest rate policy is easier to implement, however it can be restricted by ZLB
condition. The non-conventional policy of QE raises lots of questions about its
technical implementation: Which assets the central bank should purchase? How
much risk it should put on the central bank balance sheet? how easy will it be
to reverse QE in the future? In the opposite situation, when the LTV ratio in-
creases, the direct monetary contraction could raise even more implementation
issues. Whether the government should increase the interest rate or sell unconven-
tional assets in this case is an interesting topic for future research.
2.2.5 Linear Quadratic Model
In order to make our work easier, we linearize the constraints of private behavior
presented in equations (2.14-2.15)3. In the appendix, we show that the optimal
steady state is achieved under price stability, i.e.  = 1: Applying the Benigno and
Woodford (2012) method to the non-linear problem (2.13, 2.14-2.21), we receive a
pure quadratic approximation of the social objective. As we can see, it consists of
3See appendix 2.7.2-2.7.4.
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the squares of output and ination gaps similar to those of Benigno and Woodford
(2005),
Ut =  1
2
Et
1X
s=1
s(C
bYt+s + bt+s2 + b2t+s) +O3 + tip; (2.26)
where C and  are the policy makers preferences towards the output gap and
ination, respectively,  bt is the target level of output, which is inversely related
to the cost push shock and tip denotes the terms that are independent of the policy
makers choices. Coe¢ cients C ,  and  are all positive and computed in the
Appendix.
Private Sector Behavior Constraints
Linearized versions of equations (2.15-2.17) can be combined to form a New Key-
nesian Phillips Curve (2.27). A linearization of equation (2.18) shows that the
relative price dispersion term is of second-order importance and can be ignored.
Finally, (2.19-2.21) can be combined into (2.29), which relates the monetary policy
instrument, Tt; to ination and output. Therefore, as a result of simplication and
linearization, we obtain a reduced system of three equations
bt = 1  a
a
(1  )
h
(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Etbt+1; (2.27)
bqt+1 = bqt(1  (1   (1 + r)))  bt(1   (1 + r)) (2.28)
+rbrt +  (1 + r) (bYt   Etbt+1   EtbYt+1);
bt = bYt 1   bYt + q
1  q
bt   bt 1 + bqt   bqt 1+ bTt; (2.29)
where variables with hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state, and
variables without time subscript denote the steady state values.
Expression (2.29) is the essence of the paper: whatever is the target for ination
and output dynamics, one cannot neglect the uctuations in relative house value,
bqt; or credit availability, bt. In other words, for given dynamics of bt and bYt;
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monetary policy, bTt; should be adjusted to the shock in the credit constraint and
the change in relative house expenditure (bqt).
Our objective is to nd the rst-order approximation to the optimal policy
reaction function. We will allow two shocks to perturb our economy: a cost-push
shock, bt; and a credit shock, bt. We assume that bt and bt follow two independent
AR(1) processes
bt = bt 1 + t; (2.30)bt = bt 1 + t: (2.31)
The linear approximation to optimal policy can be found by maximizing the
second-order approximation to social welfare (3.55), subject to linear constraints
(2.27)-(2.29).
2.3 Optimal Monetary Policy
2.3.1 Reaction to Credit Shock
Consider the case when only credit shocks hit the economy, that is when the price
markup is constant, bt = 0. If the credit shock is the only source of instability, the
government can achieve zero losses, perfectly stabilizing both output and ination.
We formalize this statement in Proposition 2.3.1.
Proposition 2.3.1 In the absence of the cost-push shock, credit market contrac-
tion can be perfectly neutralized. Indeed, the policy maker can achieve perfect price
and output stabilization, i.e. bt = 0 and bYt = 0.
Proof. If bt = 0; output and price stability are not in contradiction with the
system of constraints (2.27)-(2.29).
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Note that complete price and output stabilization delivers the maximum value
of social welfare (3.55). Hence, the corresponding policy is optimal and the optimal
monetary policy rule in this case follows from equation (2.29) if ination and output
deviations are set to zero.
bTt =   q
1  q
bt   bt 1 + bqt   bqt 1 : (2.32)
As a result, we obtain an example where the credit constraint, bt; and the
collateral price, bqt; are not directly targeted by the government. However, they are
the only arguments in the governments reaction function. This is exactly the case
discussed in Svensson (2009). Government does not care about the nancial sector
per se, but since it a¤ects ination and output volatilities, the policy maker must
consider the change in the nancial environment when it implements its monetary
policy.
It is worth noting that in our model uctuations of bt are exogenous and there-
fore suboptimal. We assume that LTV is set exogenously in the model and inves-
tigate how policy maker could react to its uctuations.
The optimal monetary policy rule (2.32) has a straightforward interpretation.
Recalling the collateral constraint (2.3) and taking price and output stability into
consideration, it may be written as
bTt = k  bBt+1   bBt ; (2.33)
where we dene k = q
1 q : Coe¢ cient k has an important economic meaning. In
the steady state, the collateral constraint (2.3) implies that qPY = B; while the
cash-in-advance constraint (2.2) implies that PY = M + qPY: Combining those
two expressions, the debt to money ratio can be computed
B = kM: (2.34)
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Therefore, k is the marginal e¤ect on loans of a change in the base money. In
other words, a 1 dollar expansion of the monetary base will create k dollars of
loans: k = dB
dM
. Equation (2.33) tells us how much the central bank should expand
its monetary base. The expansion should just be su¢ cient to o¤set the reduction
in debt capacity.
It is noteworthy that optimal policy in the simple framework without cost-push
shocks can be reduced to two equations
Etbqt+1 = bqt(1  (1  ))  bt(1  )); (2.35)bt+1 = bt   t+1: (2.36)
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) formulated the necessary conditions for the dy-
namic linear R.E. system to have a unique solution. It states that there must be
the same number of eigenvalues larger than 1 in modulus as there are forward
looking variables. To satisfy this condition, the following relation is necessary and
su¢ cient, 1 (1 )

> 1; which is true if and only if  < 1:
In case  > 1; we will have indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. In practice,
 > 1 was observed in 2006-2007, when new mortgages were available with up to a
110% loan to value ratio. Such a high LTV might have been partly responsible for
the house bubble and the subsequent nancial crisis. Thus, according to Korteweg
and Sorensen (2012), LTV signicantly contributed to the probability of foreclosure
sales. In this light, the suggestion of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2011)
to use LTV as a policy tool for the macroprudential regulation seems to have some
justication. For the sake of stability, we calibrate the steady-state value of  to
be less than 1.
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2.3.2 Cost of Inactive Government
In this section, we will numerically assess the value of monetary policy. For this
purpose, we will compare optimal policy generating with a policy that neglects
changes in the credit market. Our alternative policy is
bTt = 0: (2.37)
If a negative credit shock hits the economy and the government does not provide
any monetary response to that shock, bTt = 0; both deation and a signicant fall
in GDP would be expected.
Figure 2.1. Output and Ination
Figure 1 shows that a 1% drop in the loan to collateral value ratio reduces
output by 0:2%: If our model is reasonably calibrated, a 20% drop in the mortgage
LTV ratio will result in a 4% fall in GDP in the absence of quantitative easing. This
would be even more damaging for consumer prices. In the absence of monetary
transfers, the model economy will experience a 12% deation.
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2.3.3 Credit Shocks and the Money Multiplier
It is well known that the money multiplier fell dramatically after the recent nan-
cial crisis. Now, the monetary authorities have to expand the monetary base to a
much larger extent in order to achieve the same expansion of broad money. The im-
portance of the money multiplier is discussed in Goodhart (2009) who criticizes the
macroeconomic literature for ignoring the money multiplier and for failing to for-
mally model it. This criticism is not entirely fair, since the behavior of the money
multiplier was a popular research topic in the 1990s. See, for example, Bernanke
(1983), Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Beenstock (1989) and, more recently, Free-
man and Kydland (2000). However, as the money multiplier was relatively stable
for more than 20 years, it became a concern of second-order importance. Although
the model we consider is very simple, it manages to identify two variables which
may explain the uctuation in the money multiplier as it is computed in equation
(2.22). First there is t; the households borrowing constraint. If we simply con-
sider mortgage contracts o¤ered before the crisis, the loan to value ratio was up
to 110% in the UK. After the crisis, it fell to 90% or by almost 20%.
The second variable, qt, is dened as
qt =
Qtht
PtYt
: (2.38)
In a relatively stable economy, where h and Y do not change, the proxy for q
will be the real price for collateral. If we refer to the mortgage market, the col-
lateral is houses and the real house price index will be a proxy for q: Therefore,
the fall in house prices should reduce the money multiplier. As the money multi-
plier is signicant for the transmission of monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder,
1988; Goodhart, 2009; Abrams, 2011), its uctuation should denitely be taken
into account when monetary policy is designed. As house prices and the loan to
value ratio a¤ect the money multiplier, they cannot be neglected by the monetary
34
authorities.
As we have previously noted, the money multiplier experienced a signicant fall
after the last nancial crisis. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the M2 multiplier in
the US and the M4 multiplier in the UK.
Figure 2.2. Money Multiplier after the 2008 Crisis
UK: M4/MO USA: M2 multiplier
Source: FRED and BoE Database
The slump of the money multiplier is consistent with our model. Although
optimal monetary policy can stabilize output and price uctuations, it causes an
even stronger and much more persistent decrease in the money multiplier than a
policy of inaction. Both policies imply a dramatic fall in the money multiplier as
we can see from Figure 3, but the stabilization policy almost doubles the size of
the fall and causes a much slower recovery.
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Figure 2.3. Optimal Transfers
We draw Figure 3 based on a linear approximation to (2.22)
cmt = k(bt + bqt): (2.39)
It can be easily seen that the optimal policy rule in the absence of a cost-push
shock (2.32) implies that optimal transfers should be equal to the negative of the
change in the money multiplier
bTt =  (bmt   bmt 1): (2.40)
Therefore, Figure 3 shows that optimal policy entails large expansion immediately
after the reduction in LTV and then a gradual contraction in all subsequent periods.
2.3.4 Credit Shock and House Prices
It is very intuitive that the relative price of collateral should react to the worsening
in the loan to value ratio. The value of collateral in our model has two components.
The rst comes directly from the utility function (such as housing, for example).
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The second is indirect and associated with the use of collateral for borrowing
purposes. The larger is LTV t, the larger is the indirect component of the collateral
value and therefore, the higher is the price of collateral. Formally, this can be
observed from equation (2.6). This is why the negative shock to t should result
in falling house prices.
Lower prices for collateral, in turn, further reduce the amount of available
credit. As a consequence, households have less money to nance their consumption
and purchase additional housing units. Figure 4 shows how house prices react to
the tightening of the householdsborrowing constraint in two di¤erent cases. The
rst case is when the government implements the optimal policy rule. The second
case is when it keeps the monetary base constant, bTt = 0. When a negative credit
market shock hits the economy, house prices decline in both cases, but optimal
policy helps reduce the fall by approximately 20%.
Figure 2.4. Collateral Price and Financial Shock
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Cost-Push Shock, House Prices and Ination
As expected, the optimal policy stabilizes ination. However it would be interest-
ing to see how the cost-push shock will a¤ect house prices and relative housing
expenditure. When the loan to value ratio is constant and only cost-push shocks
hit the economy, there is a trade o¤ between ination and house price stability.
The policy of inaction, bTt=0, in the absence of credit shocks implies constant house
prices as stated in Proposition 2.3.2.
Proposition 2.3.2 If bt = 0, policy bTt = 0 results in house price stability and
the stability of the relative collateral value, bqt = 0.
Proof. Provided in the Appendix.
Figure 5 shows that in the absence of credit shocks, the stabilization of house
prices will result in a higher volatility of CPI ination. This result is consistent
with the ndings of Iacoviello (2005).
It is interesting to see that the money multiplier, which is proportional to
relative housing expenditure, increases with the cost push shock, when optimal
policy is implemented. However, house prices decline in this case, but to a smaller
extent than the corresponding decline in output.
Figure 2.5. Simulation of Money Multiplier
House Price, Qt Relative Expenditure on Housing, qt
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2.4 Loan to Value Ratio
We have shown that the government ought to include the loan to value ratio (qt) in
its policy rule because it delivers the highest welfare measure. In that discussion,
we considered t to be exogenously given. Perhaps one of the most important
questions is to identify the factors which explain the uctuation in t:
Endogenising the loan to value ratio can have a number of very important
policy implications, for example if the LTV ratio equals the e¤ective recovery rate
of mortgages, so that direct lending to households compromises the balance sheet
of the central bank. In that case, Help to Buy and Start Up loans will result
in budget losses and a Funding for Loans scheme could in this case result in yet
more non-performing loans on the central banks balance. We are not aware of any
model which can assess these consequences.4
Although the recovery rate is highly correlated with default risk (Mora, 2012),
there are some other explanatory factors which can be inuenced by the govern-
ment.
2.4.1 Expected Collateral Ination
One of the explanatory variables of changes in LTV may be expected house price
ination (Qt) as in Iacoviello (2005). This can easily be modelled by substitution
of (2.30). bt = Et  bQt+1   bQt+ ut; (2.41)
where  < 1; and ut is a persistent shock unrelated to expected changes in house
prices.
Shocks ut can in this case be regarded as a shock to expected future house
4In our model, the central bank simply increases its liabilities in the form of outstanding cash
without any back-up on the asset side.
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prices which is another factor for consideration for the monetary authorities. In
some cases, shocks to expectations do not reect the changes in fundamentals. The
central bank will not compromise its balance sheet by buying collateral and keep
it for a longer time period until the negative shock dies out.
In this modied model, we received a very similar impulse response function
to the unexpected change in ut and still we found that an optimal policy can
completely stabilize output and ination when the credit shock a¤ects the economy.
Similarly, in response to cost-plush shocks, policy bTt = 0 stabilizes house prices
but causes a positive and relatively large response of the consumer price ination.
2.4.2 Liquidity, Transaction Costs and the Value of Collat-
eral
An increase in the collateral value is an e¤ective way to raise the money mul-
tiplier. The attractiveness of collateral may increase with liquidity. A positive
relation between the liquidity of collateral and the availability of funding is dis-
cussed in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Securization of collateral is one way
of enhancing liquidity. Di¤erent types of securitization were used for the American
housing market. Thus, according to Frame and White (2005), the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation  commonly known as Freddie Mac was created
to support the mortgage markets by securitizing mortgages. That arrangement
worked successfully for at least 30 years before the last crisis. The Funding for
Lending scheme is in line with that reasoning. The possibility of a collateral swap
for T-Bills should increase the value of collateral which can be used by commercial
banks to secure liquidity.
However, collateral securitization could also add to risk and even generate ad-
ditional moral hazard problems (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). In this context,
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the Freddie Mac arrangements were safer than the new measures proposed in the
UK. The mortgages that were eligible for securitization with Freddie Mac usually
required a 20% downpayment, while the Funding for Lending Scheme does not
specify the quality of the loans that can be used in the scheme (Bank of England,
2012). British "Help to Buy" may be even riskier, such that the government will
"loan up to 20% of the value of your new build home and "mortgage guarantee"
where lenders will be incentivised to make more mortgages available for people
with small deposits." (HM Treasury, 2013). It could mean that the government
intends to provide for the risk margin charged by the lender as an insurance against
construction risks.
Apart from the expected value of collateral, the loan to value ratio should
depend on the recovery rate for non-performing loans. The recovery rate negatively
depends on the transaction costs associated with selling the repossessed assets.
Any taxes collected during that process would negatively contribute to LTV. One
straightforward recommendation can be to abolish stamp duties for repossessed
properties.
The other way of increasing the value of collateral is to encourage the con-
struction and consumption of housing. According to Frame and White (2005),
the US government uses a tax deduction of the mortgage interest and accelerated
depreciation on rental housing for that purpose.
2.5 Preference for Money
Michael Woodford (2012) has suggested that the assumption about perfect sub-
stitutability between nancial instruments could exclude from the model some
very important economic realities. One way to make money and loans imperfectly
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substitutable is to model real money as a part of the preference function5. The
intuition is standard: people may prefer to hold money as it is a liquid asset that
can be used for certain transactions where it may be di¢ cult to use credit; i.e. rent
payment or home repairs (See Telyukova and Wright, 2008). This would justify
an additional positive value of cash money compared to credit. However, there are
other occasions when money may be less desired. For example, in electronic trans-
actions, especially when payment is made to an unknown supplier, credit cards are
safer to use than debit cards6. This is just one example to demonstrate that as
nancial market develops the preference for cash may decline.
To capture imperfect substitutability between cash and credit, we modify house-
hold preference (3.1) in the following way
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
tu(Yt; ht; Lt) = Et
1P
t=0
t

log Yt +  log ht +  log

Mt
Pt

   L
v+1
t
v + 1

;
(2.42)
where parameter  reects the preference of using money. As before, the household
maximizes its utility subject to constraints (2.2, 2.3 and 2.5). The rst order
conditions will be slightly di¤erent.
2.5.1 Labour Supply
First, the labour supply equation (2.9) of the main model will become (2.43)
 U 0L;t =
Wt
Pt

U 0m;t + U
0
c;t

; (2.43)
where U 0m is the marginal utility from real money. That can not be derived from a
conventional money in utility model without credit constraint7, where labour sup-
ply equation (2.9) is usual. The di¤erence is that in our model households can not
5We are grateful to the referee for that interesting idea.
6Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 states that a cardholders credit card company
jointly liable with the merchant for any purchases made on a credit card between £ 100 and
£ 30,000.
7See for example Walsh (2010), ch 2.
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borrow cash. The household can only increase money holding by supplying more
labour. As money is used for consumption, it gives double benets: through util-
ity from consuming good and through pleasure from possessing money. Therefore,
households supply more labour when they have a greater preference for cash8.
2.5.2 Credit Constraint
It is even more interesting see how the condition when the credit constraint is
binding will change. Equation (2.7) is becomes
2tPt = U
0
ct  
(1 + rt)
t+1
 
U 0m;t+1 + U
0
c;t+1

> 0; (2.44)
where 2t is the Lagrange multiplier to constraint (2.3). The probability that the
constraint is binding declines with the value of U 0m. In particular, if U
0
m is large
the constraint can be non-binding, in contrast to the case when U 0m = 0.
Now we will investigate when the credit constraint is binding in a steady state.
Condition (2.44) becomes
1  (1 + r)


U 0c  
(1 + r)

U 0m > 0: (2.45)
Consider the case when r is su¢ ciently small, 1  (1+r)

> 0: Then, as we noticed
above, inequality (2.45) is satised if U 0m = 0. As U
0
m increases, the constraint may
became non-binding. We can compute a threshold such that if preferences towards
money grow stronger than that value, the credit constraint becomes non-binding.
Proposition 2.5.1 If the real interest rate is smaller than the inverse discount
factor, (1+r)

< 1

; There exists a value ; such that inequality (2.45) is satised
8For a particular preference form (2.42) equation (2.43)
Lvt = wt (=(Mt=Pt) + 1=Yt)
and the labour supply increases with  and declines with real money.
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for preferences as in (2.42), when 0   < ; where
 =

1  
1  

1  (1+r)

(1+r)

: (2.46)
Proof. See appendix.
In Proposition 2.5.1 we dene the value of parameters under which the credit
constraint is binding in steady state. The larger is  the higher is the probability
that the constraint is binding. From formula (2.46) we directly obtain Corollary
2.5.2.
Corollary 2.5.2  increases with i) ination, ; and
 declines with ii) nominal interest rate, r; iii) real interest rate, (1+r)

; iv) house-
hold patience, ; v) Loan to value ratio, ; vi) intrisic value of housing, :
Corollary 2.5.2 helps to understand the evolution of the importance of the credit
constraint over time. It could have been that the LTV ratio were not so important
in the past because the real interest rate was high and thus  was low. At the
same time, the nancial market was less developed and borrowing practice was less
socially acceptable, hence  was high. Perhaps, it was a time when  was larger
than  and the borrowing constraint was non-binding. As a consequence the loan
to value ratio was not so important. According to Peñaloza and Barnhart (2011)
the culture of debt/credit payment became more acceptable overtime and, with
further development of the nancial market, hence  might have fallen below 
making the LTV ratio so vital.
2.6 Conclusion
We have shown that in contrast to some other ndings presented in the literature,
such as Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Iacoviello (2005), a simple stylized macro
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model could yield results which are in favor of including a credit market variables
into the optimal monetary policy rule. In particular, monetary authorities should
adjust their rule to unfavorable changes in loan conditions, such as a fall in the
loan to value ratio or the relative price of collateral, i.e. the real house price index.
We derived our results in a model where social welfare consists of output and
ination gaps and thus, credit market variables are not part of the government di-
rect objective. However, as mentioned in Svensson (2009), credit capacities a¤ect
output and ination through householdsbehavioral constraints. A lower house-
holdsborrowing rate reduces demand and, as a result, causes deation. We have
shown that an exogenous decrease in the loan to value ratio can be o¤set by ex-
pansionary monetary policy in such a way that credit tightening will neither a¤ect
output nor the consumer price ination.
We connected our results to the money multiplier which is the most important
variable in propagation of monetary policy, as discussed in Bernanke and Blinder
(1988) and recently in Abrams (2011). Indeed, it is very intuitive that the ex-
pansion of the monetary base should be larger when the money multiplier falls.
And since the multiplier depends on the loan to value ratio and real house prices,
optimal monetary policy should react to their uctuations. Finally, we have shown
that optimal policy generates a large and persistent fall in the money multiplier in
response to credit shocks.
Although our model is helpful in providing some justication for quantitative
easing and explaining the fall in the money multiplier, there are a number of impor-
tant extensions that should be addressed. First, the volatility of the loan to value
ratio requires an economic explanation. This would allow for a better assessment
of a number of currently proposed or adopted policy measures. Second, the assets
of the central bank are not modelled directly and, therefore, it is impossible to see
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how the risk taken on the central bank balance sheet will a¤ect the economy. If
assets are risky, the central bank will face di¢ culties when it decides to implement
a monetary contraction.
Finally, the money multiplier per se does not generate any value in our model,
and the steady-state output value does not depend on any nancial variables. This
is not the case according to King and Levine (1993) and Freeman and Kydland
(2000) who found that total borrowing by the non-nancial sector has a positive
e¤ect on economic growth.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 First-Order Conditions for Household Optimization
The household maximizes the expected discounted sum of future utility (3.1) sub-
ject to constraints (2.2, 2.3, 2.5). The corresponding Lagrangian is:
L = Et
1P
t=0
t[(U(Ct; Lt; ht)
+1t( PtCt  Qt(ht   ht 1) +Bt +Mt)
+2t ( Bt + tQtht; )
+3t( Mt +WtLt + t + Tt   (1 + rt 1)Bt 1)];
where it are Lagrange multipliers. The rst-order conditions with respect to
consumption (Ct), housing quantity (ht), debt (Bt) and money (Mt+1) are:
@L
@Ct
= U
0
c(Ct)  1tPt = 0; (2.47)
@L
@ht
= U
0
h   1tQt + 1t+1Qt+1 + 2ttQt = 0; (2.48)
@L
@Lt
= U
0
L + 3tWt (2.49)
@L
@Bt
= 1t   2t   (1 + rt)3t+1 = 0; (2.50)
@L
@Mt
= 1t   3t = 0: (2.51)
First we use (2.47) and (2.49) to claim that constraints (2.2) and (2.5) are binding
and for computing Lagrange multipliers 1t and 3t: That and (2.51) immediately
give
U
0
c(Ct)
Pt
=  U
0
L
Wt
;
as the labour supply equation. Furthermore, equation (2.50) becomes
2t =
U
0
c(Ct)
Pt
  (1 + rt)U
0
c(Ct+1)
Pt+1
:
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We need to check if 2t is strictly positive. Consider a deterministic steady
state with price stability and zero interest rate. In this case,
2 =
U
0
c(C)
P
(1  ) > 0:
That is exactly the steady state that we will investigate; assuming that the shocks
are not too large, the Lagrange multiplier should be positive and therefore con-
straint (2.3) should be binding.
Finally, combining (2.48) and (2.50) we get
U
0
h U
0
c(Ct)
Qt
Pt
+U
0
c(Ct+1)
Qt+1
Pt+1
+U
0
c(Ct)
Qt
Pt
t U
0
c(Ct+1)
Pt+1
(1 + r) tQt = 0: (2.52)
This is the same as (2.6) in the main text.
2.7.2 Optimal Steady State
Following Benigno and Woodford (2012), we will nd the best steady state for the
optimal commitment policy from a timeless perspective. The policy maker will
maximize household utility (2.13) subject to constraints (2.14-2.21). It is easy to
see that constraints (2.14) and (2.19-2.21) are only used to dene qt, Mt; Pt and
Tt. Therefore, we write a Lagrangian to reduced model (2.15-2.18 ).
Lt = Et
1P
t=0
tflog Yt   Y
v+1
t 
v+1
t
v + 1
(2.53)
+2t( Xt + Yt + aEt" 1t+1Xt+1) (2.54)
+3t
  Zt + tY v+2t vt + aEt"t+1Zt+1 (2.55)
+4t
"
Xt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
  "
"  1Zt
#
(2.56)
+5t
"
 t + t 1"t + (1  )

1  " 1t
1  a
 "
" 1
#
g: (2.57)
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The rst-order conditions are
@Lt
@t
t = + ("  1) 2t 1a" 1t Xt
+"3t 1a" 1t Zt + 4tXt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 " " 1t
1  " 1t
+5t"t 1
 
"t   " 1t

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
" 1
!
; (2.58)
@Lt
@Yt
Yt = 1  Y v+1t v+1t + 2tYt + 3ttY v+2t vt (v + 2) ; (2.59)
@Lt
@t
=  Y v+1t vt + 3tvtY v+2t v 1t   5t + 5t+1"t ; (2.60)
@Lt
@Xt
=  2t + a" 1t 2t 1 + 4t

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
; (2.61)
@Lt
@Zt
=  3t + a"t3t 1   4t
"
"  1 : (2.62)
We can easily verify that prices are stable in steady state, that is  = 1: From con-
straints (2.14-2.21) and rst-order conditions (2.58-2.62), we compute the steady-
state values for endogenous variables and Lagrange multipliers
1 = "
" 1Y
v+1; 2 =
1 Y v+1
Y (v+1)
;
X = Y
1 a ; 3 =  2 "" 1 ;
Z = " 1
"
X; 4 = 2 (1  a) ;
 = 1; 5 (1  ) (v + 1) =  Y v+1   v:
(2.63)
2.7.3 Linear Approximation to the Constraints of Private
Behavior
To make our model more tractable and comparable to the standard New Keynesian
version, we log linearize equations (2.14)-(2.21) around the zero ination steady
state9.
9All variables with hats are here expressed in terms of percentage deviations from the steady
state.
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bqt+1 = bqt(1  (1   (1 + r)))  bt(1   (1 + r)) (2.64)
+rbrt +  (1 + r) (bYt   Etbt+1   EtbYt+1)bXt = (1  a)bYt + aEt  bXt+1 + ("  1)bt+1 (2.65)bZt = (1  ) h(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Et "bt+1 + bZt+1 (2.66)bZt = bXt + a
1  abt (2.67)bt = bt 1 (2.68)cMt = bPt + bYt   q
1  q
bt + bqt (2.69)cMt = cMt 1 + bTt (2.70)
bt = bPt   bPt 1: (2.71)
We start with the log linear approximation to constraints (2.14-2.21) around
the optimal steady state. As shown in Benigno and Woodford (2005), constraint
(2.18) implies that bt = bt 1 + O2; and the log deviation of the relative price
dispersion is of second-order importance when price stability is optimal. Therefore,
the log linearization of (2.14-2.17) gives (2.64-2.67). In turn, (2.65-2.67) can be
combined into one equation which represents the Phillips Curve. First, combine
equations (2.66) and (2.67):
bXt + a
1  abt = (1  ) h(v + 2)bYt + bti+ 

"bt+1 + bXt+1 + a
1  abt+1

:
(2.72)
We subtract expression (2.65) and simplify to obtain the New Keynesian Phillips
curve
bt = 1  a
a
(1  )
h
(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Etbt+1: (2.73)
50
2.7.4 Second-Order Approximation
Applying the Benigno and Woodford (2012) algorithm, we will get the social wel-
fare function which consists of the sum of squares of the output and ination gaps.
In particular, Benigno and Woodford (2012) show that the second-order approxi-
mation to social welfare can be computed as a sum of pure second-order terms.
Ut = Et
1P
t=0
tut = Et
1P
t=0
t
"
S(ut) +
X
i
iS(Fi)
#
; (2.74)
where Fi is the dynamic constraint imposed by household behavior and i is the
value of the corresponding Lagrange multiplier in steady state. Furthermore, S() is
a functional dened on twice di¤erentiable functions of multiple arguments F (Xt),
Xt = [X1t; :::Xnt] as follows
S(F (Xt)) = bX 0tX 0r2F (X)X bXt = X
jk
@2F (X)
@Xj@Xk
XkXj bXkt bXjt;
where bXkt is the log deviation of variable Xkt from its steady-state value Xk: To
implement that algorithm, we need to apply functional S to constraints (2.15-
2.18) since all other constraints are not binding and the corresponding Lagrange
multipliers have zero values in the optimal steady state
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Su = S(log Yt   Y
v+1
t 
v+1
t
v + 1
) =  bY 2t   vY v+1bY 2t ; (2.75)
S2 = S( Xt + Yt + aEt" 1t+1Xt+1) (2.76)
= a("  1)("  2)XEtb2t+1 + 2a("  1)XEtbt+1 bXt+1;
S3 = S( Zt + tY v+2t vt + aEt"t+1Zt+1)
= (v + 2) (v + 1)Y v+2bY 2t + 2(v + 2)Y v+2bYtt (2.77)
+2aZ"bt+1 bZt+1 + aZ"("  1)b2t+1;
S4 = S
 
Xt

1  " 1t
1  a
 1
1 "
  "
"  1Zt
!
= 2
a
1  aXbt bXt + a1  aX

"
a
1  a + "  2
b2t+1; (2.78)
S5 = S
 
 t + t 1"t + (1  )

1  " 1t
1  a
 "
" 1
!
=
a
1  a

(1  a) "("  1) + " a
1  a + ("  2)
b2t : (2.79)
Using steady-state values (2.63), we can compute the welfare approximation to
(2.74)
W = Su + 2S2 + 3S3 + 4S4 + 5S5: (2.80)
First, we simplify S3: We will use (2.67) to substitute for the bt+1 bZt+1 term:
bZt+1bt+1 = bXt+1bt+1 + a
1  ab2t+1 +O3:
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Su =  
 
1 + vY v+1
 bY 2t ; (2.81)
2S2 = 2a("  1) Y
1  a

("  2)Etb2t+1 + 2Etbt+1 bXt+1 ; (2.82)
3S3 =  2 (v + 2) (v + 1)Y bY 2t + 22(v + 2)Y bYtbt;
 22a Y
1  a "
 bXt+1bt+1 + a
1  ab2t+1

(2.83)
 2a Y
1  a "("  1)b2t+1;
4S4 = 22a
Y
1  a bt bXt + 2a Y1  a

"
a
1  a + "  2
b2t+1; (2.84)
5S5 =
 a
1  a
Y v+1 + v
(1  ) (v + 1)b2t

(1  a) "("  1) + " a
1  a + ("  2)

:(2.85)
Now we use that for any dynamic variable xt;
+1X
t=0
txt+1 =
1

+1X
t=0
txt   1

x0 =
1

+1X
t=0
txt + tip;
where x0 is considered a "precommitted" variable which cannot be changed because
of commitment and therefore, it is regarded as "term independent of policy (tip)".
Finally, we can compute the welfare approximation to (2.74).
Ut +O3 = Et
+1X
t=0
tW =  Et
+1X
t=0
t

C
bYt + bt2 + b2t ; (2.86)
where the parameters are dened as follows
C =
 
1 + v   2Y v+1 ;
 =
1  Y v+1
1 + v   2Y v+1
v + 2
v + 1
;
1 =
"
"  1Y
v+1;
 =
a

(1  Y v+1) "+ (Y v+1 + v)  (1  a) "("  1) + " 2+2a
1 a

(1  a) (1  ) (v + 1) :
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2.7.5 Solution to Central Bank LQ Problem
Central bank maximizes (2.86) subject to constraint (2.73) only, since all other
constraints are non-binding,
Jt =  1
2
Et
1X
t=1
t
264 C
bYt   bt2 + b2t
+t

 bt + 1 aa (1  ) h(v + 2)bYt + bti+ bt+1
375 :
(2.87)
The rst-order conditions imply the optimal ination dynamics
bt = bYt 1   bYt    bt 1   bt ; (2.88)
where  = C

a
(1 )(v+2)(1 a) :
2.7.6 Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
In this appendix we will show that a moderate fall in the LTV ratio can be neutral-
ized by lowering the interest rate and without transfers. Consider model (2.14)-
(2.21) and a policy which aims to achieve a complete stabilization of the credit
shock by the means of interest rate. That is Tt = Tt+1 = 0, t = t+1 = 1;Yt+1 =
Yt = Yt 1. That implies constant velocity of cash and from (2.19) it follows that
product tqt is also constant.
t+1qt+1 = tqt = t 1qt 1 = A; (2.89)
To compute the interest rate dynamics for stabilizing policy we will combine (2.14)
for periods t and t  1 with (2.89) and on the assumption that prices and output
are stable, Yt
t+1Yt+1
= 1; we derive
rt = rt 1 +
1


1
t 1
  1
t

 

Et 1
1
t
  Et 1
t+1

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2.7.7 Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Proposition 2.3.2 If bt = 0; a policy of inaction, bTt = 0; results in house price
stability and the stability of the relative collateral value.
Proof. Consider dynamics (2.28)-(2.29) with bTt = 0; bt = 0:
bt = 1  a
a
(1  )
h
(v + 2)bYt + bti+ Etbt+1; (2.90)
Etbqt+1 = bqt(1  (1  )) + (bYt   Etbt+1   EtbYt+1); (2.91)
bt = bYt 1   bYt + q
1  q (bqt   bqt 1) : (2.92)
Plugging Equation (2.92) with one lead into (2.91), we would get that the dynamic
for relative house expenditure does not depend on a shock or any other variable in
the system.
Etbqt+1 = bqt(1  (1  ))   q
1  q (Etbqt+1   bqt) ;
which implies complete stability, bqt = 0: Moreover, by denition, Qt = qtPtYt
ination of house prices is
bQt := bQt   bQt 1 = bt + bYt   bYt 1 + (bqt   bqt 1) :
Combining it with (2.92) and bqt = 0; we get zero house price ination in every
period.
2.7.8 Money in the Utility Function
The Lagrangian to the household problem when there is a preference over the
means of payment is giving by:
L = Et
1P
t=0
t[

U(Ct;
Mt
Pt
; Lt; ht

+1t( PtCt  Qt(ht   ht 1) +Bt +Mt)
+2t ( Bt + tQtht; )
+3t( Mt +WtLt + t + Tt   (1 + rt 1)Bt 1)];
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where it are Lagrange multipliers. The rst-order conditions with respect to
consumption (Ct), housing quantity (ht), debt Bt and money (Mt+1) are:
@L
@Ct
= U
0
c(Ct)  1tPt = 0; (2.93)
@L
@ht
= U
0
h;t   1tQt + 1t+1Qt+1 + 2ttQt = 0; (2.94)
@L
@Lt
= U
0
L;t + 3tWt = 0; (2.95)
@L
@Bt
= 1t   2t   (1 + rt)3t+1 = 0; (2.96)
@L
@Mt
=
U 0m
Pt
+ 1t   3t = 0: (2.97)
It changes the labor supply equation
2.7.9 Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
Proof. Condition (2.45) for preference function (2.42) implies
M
PC
> 
(1+r)

1  (1+r)

: (2.98)
From the rst order conditions (2.93), (2.94), (2.96) and (2.97), we get the Euler
equation for investment in the housing market
U
0
h;t   U
0
c;t
Qt
Pt
+ U
0
c;t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
+ t
Qt
Pt

U 0ct  
(1 + rt)
t+1
 
U 0m;t+1 + U
0
c;t+1

= 0;
which in steady state is the same as (2.99)
   Q
PC
(1  ) +  Q
PC

1  (1 + r)


   (1 + r)

PC
M

= 0: (2.99)
Recall that if the constraint is binding, then  Q
CP
= 1   M
CP
: We use letter u to
denote the velocity of money, u = M
CP
; equation (2.99) becomes
   (1  u)

(1  ) + (1  u)

1  (1 + r)


   (1 + r)

1
u

= 0:
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Consider the function f(u) :=   (1 u)

(1  )+(1  u)
h
1  (1+r)

i
   (1+r)

1
u

:
It is easy to see that when  > 0; there exists a unique solution u 2 [0; 1] such
that f(u) = 0: To prove it we need to note that, f(u)u is a quadratic function
with positive rst coe¢ cient and lim
u!0
f(u) =  1; f(1) =  > 0: That implies that
for any u 2 [0; u), f(u) < 0; and for any u > u; it follows that f(u) > 0: To prove
that the credit constraint is binding, we simply need to show that u > 
(1+r)

1 (1+r)

;
which in the case of positive  and small interest rate, (1+r)

< 1; is equivalent to
f(
(1+r)

1 (1+r)

) < 0: That is the same as condition  <

1  
1 

1 (1+r)

(1+r)

:
2.7.10 Parameter Values
We use the following parameter values: q = 0:5; v = 2,  = 0:95,  = 0:8; a = 0:5,
" = 6;  = 1:1;  = 0:95;  = 0:95;  = 0:005:
57
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Abrams, B., A., 2011. Financial-sector shocks in a credit-view model, Eco-
nomics Letters, vol. 112, pp. 256-258.
[2] Adam, K., Roberto, M., B, 2007."Discretionary Monetary Policy and the Zero
Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
54, pp. 728-752.
[3] Ashcraft, B., Schuermann, T., 2008. Understanding the Securitization of Sub-
prime Mortgage Credit, Sta¤Reports 318, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
[4] Bank of England, 2012. Funding for Lending Scheme, Market Notice.
[5] Beenstock M., 1989. The Determinants of the Money Multiplier in the United
Kingdom, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 21, pp. 464-480.
[6] Benigno, P., Nisticò, S. 2013. Safe Assets, Liquidity and Monetary Policy,
London, Centre for Economic Policy Research, DP9767.
[7] Benigno, P., Woodford, M. 2005. Ination Stabilization And Welfare: The
Case Of A Distorted Steady State, Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation, vol. 3, pp. 1185-1236.
[8] Benigno, P. and Woodford, M. 2012. Linear-Quadratic Approximation of Op-
timal Policy Problems, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 147, pp. 1-42.
[9] Bernanke, B., S., 1983. Nonmonetary E¤ects of the Financial Crisis in Prop-
agation of the Great Depression, American Economic Review, vol. 73, pp.
257-76.
[10] Bernanke, B., S., Reinhart, R., V., Sack, B., P., 2004. Monetary Policy Alter-
natives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, vol. 35, pp. 1-100.
[11] Bernanke, B., S, Blinder, A., S, 1988. Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand,
American Economic Review, vol. 78, pp. 435-39.
[12] Bernanke, B., Gertler, M. 1989. Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluc-
tuations, American Economic Review, vol. 79, pp. 14-31.
[13] Bernanke, B., Gertler, M. 2001. Should Central Banks Respond to Movements
in Asset Prices?, American Economic Review, vol. 91, pp. 253-257.
58
[14] Bernanke, B., Mishkin, F. 1997. Ination Targeting: A New Framework for
Monetary Policy?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 11, pp. 97-116.
[15] Blanchard, O., Kahn, C., M. 1980. The Solution of Linear Di¤erence Models
under Rational Expectations, Econometrica, vol. 48, pp. 1305-1313.
[16] Brunnermeier M., K., Eisenbach, T., M., Sannikov, Y., 2012, Macroeconomics
with Financial Frictions: A Survey, NBER Working Papers 18102.
[17] Brunnermeier, M., K., Pedersen, L., H., 2009, Market Liquidity and Funding
Liquidity, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 22, pp. 2201-2238.
[18] Calvo, G., A. 1983. Staggered Prices in an Utility-Maximizing Framework,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 12, pp. 383-398.
[19] Carlstrom, C., T., Fuerst, T., S., 1995. Interest Rate Rules vs. Money Growth
Rules a Welfare Comparison in a Cash-in-Advance Economy, Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, vol. 36, pp. 247-267.
[20] Clarida, R., H. 2012. What Has - And Has Not - Been Learned About Mon-
etary Policy in a Low-Ination Environment?, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, vol. 44, pp. 130-140.
[21] Clarida, R., G., J., Gertler, M. The Science of Monetary Policy: A New
Keynesian Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 37, pp. 1661-
1707.
[22] Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Wieland, J., 2012. The Optimal Ination
Rate in New Keynesian Models: Should Central Banks Raise Their Ination
Targets in Light of the Zero Lower Bound?, Review of Economic Studies, vol.
79, pp. 1371-1406.
[23] Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M., 1992, Liquidity E¤ects and the Monetary
Transmission Mechanism, NBER Working Paper No. 3974.
[24] Dell Ariccia, G., Detragiache, E., Rajan, R., 2008. The Real E¤ect of Banking
Crises, Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 17, pp. 89-112.
[25] Dixit, A., Stiglitz, J. 1977. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity, American Economic Review, vol. 67, pp. 297-308.
59
[26] Fisher, I., 1933. The Debt-Deation Theory of Great Depressions, Economet-
rica, vol. 1, pp. 337-357.
[27] Frame, W., S, Lawrence J., W., 2005. Fussing and Fuming over Fannie and
Freddie: How Much Smoke, How Much Fire?, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, vol. 19, pp. 159-184.
[28] Freeman, S., Kydland, F., E. 2000. Monetary Aggregates and Output, Amer-
ican Economic Review, vol. 90, pp. 1125-1135.
[29] Friedman, M., 2000. Canada and Flexible Exchange Rates, the keynote speech
on "Revisiting the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates - 2000 conference", Bank
of Canada.
[30] Friedman, M., 2006. Why Money Matters, Wall Street Journal, November
17th.
[31] Gambacorta, L., Hofmann, B., G. Peersman, 2012, The E¤ectiveness of Un-
conventional Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Cross-Country
Analysis , BIS Working Papers 384, Bank for International Settlements.
[32] Goodhart C. A. E. , 2009, The Continuing Muddles of Monetary Theory: A
Steadfast Refusal to Face Facts, Economica, vol. 76, pp. 821-830.
[33] Hildebrand, M., P. 2006. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets, Financial
Markets and Portfolio Management, vol. 20, pp. 7-18.
[34] HM Treasury, 2013, Budget 2013.
[35] Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 2011, Loan-to-value ratio as a macropru-
dential tool - Hong Kong SARs experience and cross-country evidence, BIS
Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Capital ows,
commodity price movements and foreign exchange intervention, volume 57,
pages 163-178.
[36] Iacoviello, M. 2005. House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Monetary Policy
in the Business Cycle, American Economic Review, vol. 95, pp. 739-764.
[37] King, R., G., Levine, R., 1993, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be
Right, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, pp. 717-37.
60
[38] Korteweg, A., Sorensen, M., 2012, Estimating Loan-to-Value and Foreclosure
Behavior, NBER Working Papers, No. 17882.
[39] Kosuke, A., Proudman, J., Vliegbe, J. 2004. House Prices, Consumption and
Monetary Policy: A Financial Accelerator Approach, Journal of Financial
Intermediation, vol. 13, pp. 414-435.
[40] Levine, P., Pearlman, J., Pierse, R., 2008. Linear-Quadratic Approximation,
External Habit and Targeting Rules, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol, vol. 32, pp. 3315-3349.
[41] Lucas, R., Stokey, N., 1987, Money and Interest Rate in a Cash-in-Advance
Economy, Econometrica, vol. 55, pp. 491-513.
[42] Monacelli, T., 2009, New Keynesian Models, Durable Goods, and Collateral
Constraints, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 56, pp. 242-254.
[43] Mora, N., 2012., What determines creditor recovery rates?, Economic Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II.
[44] McCallum, B., T., 1985, On Consequences and Criticisms of Monetary Tar-
geting, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 17, pp. 570-97.
[45] Midrigan, V., Philippon, T. 2011. Household Leverage and the Recession,
NYU Working Paper, No FIN-11-038.
[46] Mishkin, S., F. 2011. Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis,
NBER Working Paper, No. 16755.
[47] Peersman, G., Smets, F. 1999. The Taylor Rule: A Useful Monetary Policy
Benchmark for the Euro Area?, International Finance, vol. 2, pp. 85-116.
[48] Peñaloza L., Barnhar, M., Living U.S. Capitalism: The Normalization of
Credit/Debt, Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 38, pp. 743-762
[49] Telyukova, I., A., Wright, R., 2008. A Model of Money and Credit, with
Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle, Review of Economic Studies,
vol. 75, pp. 629-647.
[50] Taylor, J., B. 1993. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December 1993, vol. 39, pp.
195-214.
61
[51] Thorbecke, W. 2012. On Stock Market Returns and Monetary Policy, The
Journal of Finance, vol. 52, pp. 635-654.
[52] Svensson L. 2009. Flexible Ination Targeting: Lessons from the Financial Cri-
sis, Speech Given at the Workshop Towards a New Framework for Monetary
Policy? Lessons from the Crisis.Amsterdam: Organized by De Nederland-
sche Bank.
[53] Walsh, C. 2010, , Monetary Theory and Policy, MIT Press, 3d edition, pp.
594.
[54] Woodford, M. 2001. The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy, American
Economic Review, vol. 91, pp. 232-237.
62
CHAPTER 3
MONETARY POLICY IN THE MODEL WITH FINANCIAL AND
LABOUR MARKET FRICTIONS
3.1 Introduction1
In earlier works (Ravenna and Walsh (2011), Walsh (2005), Blanchard and Gali
(2010) to name a few) the relation between monetary policy and labor market
was analyzed. It was found, that reaction on unemployment in the Taylor-type
interest rate rule is optimal (for more details, see Faia (2008) or Faia (2008a)). In
this note we extend previous analysis by adding rms nancial market frictions
and show that the same result holds, that is, reaction to unemployment is still
optimal. We also nd that coe¢ cient on unemployment in Taylor-type interest
rate rule depends on the extent of workers bargaining power.
As a starting point we use model considered in Monacelli, Trigari and Quadrini
(2011) and extend it in several ways. Firstly, we introduce sticky prices by using
Calvo (1983) framework and derive New-Keynesian Phillips curve. Secondly, we
compute optimal monetary policy and use it as a benchmark to compare all other
regimes. Thirdly, we use Benigno and Woodford (2005) algorithm to asses di¤erent
monetary policy rules performance in terms of the welfare measure.
The main novelty of our paper as compared to the previous literature is the
connection between nancial and labour markets. For instance, works by Trigari
(2004), Walsh (2005), Thomas (2008), Faia (2008, 2009) to name a few did not
have either any nancial frictions or a central bank who would be responsible for
monetary policy.
The key idea of nancial and labor market connection could be summed up as
1Codes used in this chapter could be seen at https://github.com/Sarunas-
Girdenas/2nd_chapter.
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follows. In our model rms have incentive to borrow because of the wage bargaining
process. That is, they are issuing debt to reduce bargaining surplus which in
turn reduces wage paid to workers. For any given value of workers bargaining
power, higher debt results in lower wage. This is di¤erent channel than Petrosky-
Nadeau (2014) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) where rms participate
in a credit market to nance vacancy costs. In their works the source of frictions
in the economy is the evolving condition of credit market (tightness of borrowing
constraint). As credit becomes more easily accessible to rms during the boom,
they create more vacancies and thus unemployment falls.
Our approach is also di¤erent from Mumtaz and Zanetti (2014) where entre-
preneurs are borrowing to nance production cost. In their model, when nancial
shock hits rms cut their production because of the shortage of capital to keep the
production level. In our model nancial shock reduces rms credit thus reducing
surplus and as a result rms bargaining ability deteriorates resulting in an increase
in wage and unemployment.
In addition to nancial market, our model also includes central bank that could
a¤ect borrowing by changing interest rate thus indirectly inuencing wage. Con-
sider the case of central bank lowering interest rate. In such case borrowing would
become cheaper and rms would increase their debt. By doing so they would
reduce bargaining surplus thus lowering wage. This particular mechanism is the
reason why reaction to unemployment in interest rate rule depends on the extent
of workers bargaining power.
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, we present model with imperfect
nancial market similar to Monacelli, Trigari and Quadrini (2011). Then we in-
troduce labour market frictions using Pissarides (1987) framework. In the third
section we derive optimal monetary policy and discuss the relation between interest
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rate and bargaining power. Then we compute the welfare measure using Beningo
and Woodford (2005) algorithm. The last section concludes the chapter.
To investigate this we are going to use the New-Keynesian DSGE model with
imperfect nancial and labour markets. But before dwelling deeply into the speci-
cations of the model we are going to provide some empirical evidence and intuition.
3.1.1 Theoretical Approach
Despite the fact of unemployment being one of the target variables of central banks,
in academic literature there are still only a handful of papers which asses monetary
policy in the framework with labour and nancial market frictions. We aim to
contribute to this eld by providing a simple macroeconomic model with credit
and labour market frictions which could be used to investigate the relationship
between the nancial and labour markets.
As a starting point we use paper by Monacelli, Trigari and Quadrini (2011).
We extend it in several ways. Firstly, we introduce sticky prices by using Calvo
(1983) framework and derive New-Keynesian Phillips curve. Secondly, we compute
optimal monetary policy reaction to both nancial and labour market frictions and
use it as a benchmark to compare all other policies. Thirdly, we use Benigno and
Woodford (2005) algorithm to asses di¤erent monetary policy rulesperformance
in terms of the unconditional welfare measure. These extensions allow us to inves-
tigate monetary policy regimes that could be used to counteract negative e¤ects
of nancial market shock to unemployment.
The main novelty of our paper as compared to previous literature is the con-
nection between rmsnancial market and the labour market with the search and
matching frictions. For instance, works by Trigari (2004), Walsh (2005), Thomas
(2008), Faia (2008, 2009) to name a few did not have either any nancial frictions
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or a central planner who would be responsible for monetary policy. By having
these features we can investigate how unanticipated decrease in rmsloansre-
payment probability may a¤ect unemployment and other labour market charac-
teristics. Zanneti (2012) has showed that nancial variables a¤ect labour market
through aggregated demand channel.
Since the interest rate policy which is solely based on the current or forward
looking rule is not su¢ cient to generate local stability when the labour market
frictions are present (Zanneti 2006), we investigate monetary policy regimes that
also feed back on frictions in nancial and labour markets. In particular, we choose
3 di¤erent interest rate rules in spirit of Taylor (1993) to account for policy makers
preferences towards rmsborrowing and variables which dene labour market such
as aggregate level of unemployment.
We have found that the interest rate rule with response to ination and labour
market frictions (unemployment) performs closest to the optimal policy in terms
of the unconditional welfare measure. This might be explained by the fact that
our economy is distorted by labour market frictions, therefore reaction on it (along
with ination) gives the best result. It is somehow similar to Faia (2008 and 2009)
where it was showed that the level of unemployment should be included in the
policy makers rule. In addition, we show that the sign of the unemployment
reaction parameter in the interest rate rule depends on the bargaining power of
workers.
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, we present model with imperfect
nancial market similar to Monacelli, Trigari and Quadrini (2011). Then we in-
troduce labour market frictions using Pissarides (1987) framework. In the third
section we compare 3 monetary policy regimes to the optimal policy. Then we
compute the unconditional welfare measure using Beningo and Woodford (2005)
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algorithm. The last section concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model
There are four key ingredients that form the model. Firstly, households consume
nal goods, make a choice to be employed or unemployed and save in riskless assets
which yield interest rate and shares of rms which pay dividends. Secondly, we have
intermediary goods (wholesale) producers who participate in the labour market by
posting vacancies, employing agents and borrowing against their expected future
prot. Thirdly, there are nal good producers who are taking the wholesale good
and selling it to households in the sticky prices (Calvo (1983)) environment. Lastly,
there is government which aims to minimize the negative e¤ects of unanticipated
shocks by conducting monetary policy according to Taylor (1993) type rules. We
begin our presentation with households.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of agents of total mass 1 with a lifetime utility. At any point
in time agents can be employed or unemployed. They save in two types of assets:
shares of rms and assets. Households provide labour and get paid for it. They
also could be employed with probability pEt . We follow Ravenna and Walsh (2011)
and use CRRA functional form for the households utility
UHt = Et
1X
t=0
t

C1 t
1  

; (3.1)
where  is a relative risk aversion. Households consume two kinds of goods: market
goods Cmt and domestically produced goods by unemployed agents a(1 Nt):
Ct = C
m
t + a(1 Nt); (3.2)
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where a is the unemployment benet (in real terms) and Nt is the number of
employed members of household. We assume that everything what is produced is
also consumed in our economy. Therefore we can write the following equation
Yt = C
m
t + kvt. (3.3)
It says that all goods in the economy is consumed by households (Cmt ) and rms
(kvt) where k is the cost of posting vacancy and vt is the number of available
vacancies. Now we dene measure of the labour market tightness by introducing
a ratio of available vacancies to a number of unemployed agents t = vtut . Then
equation (3.3) becomes
Yt = C
m
t + ktut: (3.4)
Recall, that we dened households consumption as being the sum of domestically
produced goods a(1 Nt) and nal goods Cmt : Therefore we can use (3.2) to express
Cmt as C
m
t = Ct   a(1   Nt): By substituting it into (3.4) we obtain economys
resource constraint
Yt = Ct   a(1 Nt) + ktut: (3.5)
where a is value of labour in home production. Households liquidity position
at time t is dened as the sum of income received from employed and unemployed
members
It = wtNt + a(1 Nt); (3.6)
where wt real wage dened as wt = WtPt . We also let households to hold assets which
could be used as savings. Next period assets Aht (in nominal terms) is dened as
follows
Aht+1 = A
h
t it   PtCt +WtNt + a(1 Nt)Pt + t; (3.7)
where Wt is the nominal wage and the nominal prot of rms is denoted by t.
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Now we can state household optimization problem
maxEt
1X
t=0
t

C1 t
1  

;
s.t. Aht+1 = A
h
t it   PtCt +WtNt + a(1 Nt)Pt:
which leads to the following denitions. Marginal utility of consumption (in real
terms)
t =  C
 
t
Pt
; (3.8)
and interest rate
1
it
= Et

t+1
t

: (3.9)
Combining two equations above we obtain relation between interest rate it and
ination t (Euler equation)
1
it
= Et

C t+1
C t t+1

: (3.10)
3.2.2 Firms
Our model is populated by two kinds of rms: intermediary good producers as in
Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) who participate in the labour and nan-
cial markets by posting vacancies and borrowing and nal good producers who
take intermediary good and sell it to households in sticky prices (Calvo (1983))
environment.
Intermediary good producers
As in Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) there are two types of intermediary
goods producers: young and old rms.
Young rms are those which are created at the same period once the posted
vacancy is lled with the worker. At this period the only decision they make is how
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much to borrow. Capital obtained from the nancial market in the rst period is
distributed to shareholders of the rm. Wage is paid only in the subsequent period
if a match is not separated.
Old rms are the matches, which were not separated during the last period.
At this stage old rms must bargain with the current worker and pay wage, make
a decision about the future borrowing and produce.
It is important to notice that rms in our model have incentive to borrow up
to the limit because high debt reduces bargaining surplus which in turn reduces
the wage paid to workers. Compared to Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011)
our production sector is more complicated because we require nal good producers
(which operate in a sticky prices environment) to derive Phillips curve.
- Old Firms
We begin our presentation by dening the production function of old wholesale
rms which only input is labour:
Yt = zNt; (3.11)
with z being productivity parameter. Then we can intuitively dene number of
unemployed agents (matches) by normalizing total mass to 1 and subtracting those
who are employed
ut = 1  (1  )Nt 1; (3.12)
where  is exogenously given probability that a match will be separated. Now we
can immediately dene number of employed workers
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +m(ut; vt): (3.13)
It is equal to matches from the last periods which were not separated (1  )Nt 1
and the newly created matches captured by CRS matching function (Pissarides
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1987) with vt denoting number of available (posted) vacancies, & being a matching
parameter and  being vacancy elasticity of matches
m(ut; vt) = &v

t u
1 
t : (3.14)
Probability that the posted vacancy is going to be lled (qt) is a ratio of available
vacancies to lled vacancies
qt =
m(ut; vt)
vt
: (3.15)
In the same way probability that worker will nd a job, pEt ; (the match will be
created) is equal to
pEt =
m(ut; vt)
ut
: (3.16)
Using the two equations above and a particular form of the matching function
(3.14) we obtain the relationship between the probability that vacancy will be lled
and the probability that worker will nd a job
pEt = (qt)
  
1  &

1  : (3.17)
Making use of denition of labour market tightness, t = vtut , we can rewrite equa-
tion (3.17) as
pEt = &

t : (3.18)
Now we want to derive the relation between the level of employment and the
probability that worker will nd a job. This can be achieved by substituting
equations (3.12), (3.18) and (3.13)
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 + &t (1  (1  )Nt 1) : (3.19)
Lastly, we may also show how level of employed agents (Nt) a¤ects output. For
this purpose we use equations (3.12) and (3.5)
Yt = Ct   a (1 Nt) + kt (1  (1  )Nt 1) : (3.20)
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This equations shows that the higher the number of employed agents (Nt) the
greater is the level of output. Now we are going to look at workers bargaining in
the old rms since young rms are not negotiating with workers in the rst period.
Firstly, we set up an equation which denes wholesale rmsequity value in
terms of productivity, real wage and borrowing
Jt = zt   wt + bt   bt 1
t
it 1 + (1  )Et [Jt+1] : (3.21)
The above equation states that the rms value depends on a wage paid to workers
and on the size of the loan which could be obtained from the bank. Hence, we can
see the same result as in Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011): rms choice of
a new debt does not depend on the past debt and current wage wt. This could be
seen by di¤erentiating rms equity value (3.21) with respect to the new debt bt :
@Jt
@bt
= 1 + (1  )@Jt+1
@bt
. That is, wage does not a¤ect choice of borrowing. As we
will see later, this result will signicantly simplify the description and analysis of
the rms nancial market.
Now we can dene bargaining surplus (St) which is split between worker and
rm and is dened as St = Jt + Vt   Ut. The expression of surplus is as follows
St =
z
Xt
  a+ bt   bt 1
t
it 1 + (1  )Et [St+1]  pEt Et [St+1] ; (3.22)
where Xt is a markup dened as the price ratio
pwt
Pt
with pwt denoting the wholesale
good price and Pt is the aggregate price of the nal good.
When the worker is employed in a wholesale rm, his value is
Vt = wt + Et [(1  )Vt+1 + Ut+1] ; (3.23)
where wt is the wage paid to workers (in real terms), (1  ) is probability of a
match separation and nally, Ut is the value of being unemployed which we dene
as follows
Ut = a+ Et

pEt Vt+1 + (1  pEt )Ut+1

; (3.24)
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where the term in brackets denote trade-o¤ between being employed and unem-
ployed.
Finally, wage is given by
wt = (1  ) a+ 

z
Xt
  bt 1
t
it 1

+
k
h
t+1
it
t + p
E
t 
i
qt

t

t+1
it
2
+ 
 ; (3.25)
where t is a borrowing parameter subject to a negative shock. As we can see, it
negatively depends on bt 1. That is, the higher is the borrowing, the lower is the
current wage since worker gets a fraction of output net of debt. Therefore, for the
given value of bargaining power  higher borrowing reduces wage. Furthermore,
it is clear that policy maker could indirectly a¤ect wage by changing interest. See
appendix for details of wage derivation.
- Young Firms
A new rm is created when the new match occurs as dened in (3.14). Then
the new vacancy which is lled by the worker holds the following value:
Qt =
bt
it
t+1 + (1  )Et [St+1] : (3.26)
Firms post vacancies as long as the value of vacancy is positive. In other words,
value of the lled vacancy Qt must be greater than than the incurred cost k: Thus
we can write the condition under which rms will keep on posting vacancies as
qtQt = k; (3.27)
where k is the cost of posting vacancy and qt is the probability that posted vacancy
is going to be lled. Rearranging two equations above we obtain the following
expression which links cost of labour market (probability that posted vacancy will
be lled) with nancial market (rmsvalue which depends on borrowing):
k
qt
= bt + (1  )Et [St+1] : (3.28)
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In the next period young rm will become old and implement the bargaining
as we have previously described.
Intermediary Goods Producers Financial Market
We begin by introducing the key assumptions. Firstly, we do not explicitly model
the nancial institutions which are providing loans to rms. We simply assume
that they can costlessly issue the required amount of credit. Secondly, if a match
is separated and as a result rm defaults, then its value is equal to 0 and the
lender does not get any compensation. Because of this, lenders impose borrowing
constraint which tightness is dened by the parameter t. This ensures that rms
do not default when the match is not separated and thus lender is willing to issue
loan as long as borrowing constraint is binding.
The reason why we can work with only one representative rm and use the
same borrowing constraint is the fact that choice of debt does not depend on wage2.
Because of this both young and old rms face the same borrowing constraint.
If we keep in mind that the real value of rms debt is bt, then the borrowing
constraint can be expressed as
btitEt

1
t+1

= t(1  )Et [St+1] : (3.29)
Here t is borrowing parameter that is subject to shock,  2 (0; 1) is workers
bargaining power. We can clearly see that the amount which rm could borrow
depends on its expected bargaining surplus (denoted as Et [St+1]).
Economically speaking, borrowing constraint has a couple of important im-
plications. Firstly, it implies that rms are borrowing against their future prot
(denoted as their part of total bargaining surplus) which depends on workers bar-
gaining power . Secondly, we can think of t as being the probability that rm
2For more details about this result see Monacelli, Quadrini, Trigari (2011).
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will repay its debt hence it must be between 0 and 1. If it drops, then it means
that the larger number of rms are not able to meet their nancial commitments
and as a result the aggregate level of borrowing falls.
We specify AR(1) process which perturbs nancial market (rmsrepayment
probability)
t = t 1   ";t; (3.30)
where ";t is Gaussian white noise processes with 0 mean and variance 2 and 
is persistency parameters of shock. It is noteworthy, that shock is negative in t.
- Choice of Debt
It is clear, that rms will choose the maximum level of debt possible only
when the borrowing (enforcement) constraint is binding. To see this, let rms
maximize their equity value (3.21) subject to the borrowing constraint (3.29). If
we denote corresponding Lagrange multiplier by 't and substitute Et [Jt+1] using
Jt = (1  )St maximization exercise will become
max zt   wt + bt   bt 1
t
it 1 + (1  )(1  )Et [St+1] ; (3.31)
s.t. btitEt

1
t+1

 t(1  )Et [St+1] :
First order conditions yields the following expression of the Lagrange multiplier
't =

t+1
it

   (1  ) (1  )
1 + t(1  )
: (3.32)
Since in steady state we have that 
i
= ; equation (3.32) could be rearranged to
' =
    (1  ) (1  )
1 + (1  ) : (3.33)
From the above expression we can clearly see, that ' is positive if we restrict
parameters ,  and  being in the interval between 0 and 1. This is claim is
formally summarized below.
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Lemma 3.2.1 Borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state if workers have
any bargaining power ( 2 (0; 1)) and the match separation probability is positive
( 2 (0; 1)).
Proof. Follows directly from rst order conditions of rms optimization problem.
The above proposition shows that borrowing constraint is indeed binding3.
3.2.3 Final Good Producers and Price Setting
We assume that the nal good producers takes intermediary good and sells it to
households in the sticky prices (Calvo 1983) framework. They produce according
to the following production function where " is the elasticity of substitution and
Y ft is the production of nal goods
Y ft =
Z N
0
y"t (i)di
 1
"
: (3.34)
We assume that nal goods are imperfectly substituted and that consumption
is dened over Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) basket of goods, Y ft =
hR 1
0
Yt(i)
" 1
" di
i "
" 1
: The
average price-level of the nal good Pt, is known to be Pt =
hR 1
0
pt(i)
1 "di
i 1
1 "
.
The demand for each retailersnal good is given by
Yt(i) =

pt(i)
Pt
 "
Y ft ; (3.35)
where pt(i) is the nominal price of the nal good produced in industry i and Yt(i)
denotes aggregate demand for a good produced in i-th sector. Each retailer chooses
sale price pt(i) and buys intermediary good at a price pwt which is taken as given.
The nal good sale price pt(i) could be changed only with probability 1 $. Let
3If the constraint were not binding, then rms borrowing would be either zero or innity.
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us call the new price pt (i) and corresponding demand Y

t+k =

pt (i)
Pt+k
 "
Y ft . The
nal good producersprot maximization problem could be written as follows
t(i) =

pt (i)
Pt
  P
w
t
Pt

pt (i)
Pt
 "
Y ft : (3.36)
For the sake of simplicity we can substitute p

t (i)
Pt+
=
pt (i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+
. Now we rewrite
the optimization problem
max
pt (i)
Et
1X
=0
$
t+
t

pt (i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+
  P
w
t+
Pt+

pt (i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+
 "
Y ft+ : (3.37)
Because of the assumption that only proportion of rms could change the prices
every period we know that price index evolves according to the following law of
motion
Pt =
 
$P 1 "t 1 + (1 $)pt (i)1 "
 1
1 " : (3.38)
Solving nal good producers optimization problem and using the law of motion of
prices we derive standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
bt+1 =  bXt + bt; (3.39)
where variables with hats denote deviations from the steady state and  = (1 $)(1 $)
$
:
The formal derivation is provided in the appendix.
3.2.4 Steady State E¢ ciency Analysis
To derive optimal policy reaction we let policy maker maximize householdsutility
(3.1) subject to the behavioral constraints presented in equations 3.22, 3.29, 3.28,
3.84, 3.85, 3.86, 3.10, ??, 3.18, ??, 3.11 and 3.19. The formal derivation of optimal
monetary policy is showed in appendix.
In the previous literature there was reported (for example Thomas (2008) or
Faia (2008 and 2008a)) that in the optimal steady state prices are stable, that is
77
 = 1; where  is the steady state ination. Indeed, we can conrm this nding by
looking at the policy makers optimization problem. Hence we can formally put it
as follows.
Lemma 3.2.2 Optimal steady state implies price stability, that is  = 1:
Proof. Follows from policy makers optimization problem provided in appendix.
Further to this, we employ Hosios (1990) condition that workers bargaining
power () is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the
available vacancies (). This condition implies that unemployment in steady state
is Parreto e¢ cient. This assumption is needed to ensure that our economy evolves
around the e¢ cient steady state because it is needed for correct welfare ranking
(Faia 2008a). However, in Benigno and Woodford (2005) it is reported that if
the model is approximated to up to the second order4, the correct welfare ranking
could be preserved even if steady state is ine¢ cient.
In addition, since Hosios (1990) condition holds, we can conclude that the
unemployment level in steady state is e¢ cient (as it is showed in Ravenna and
Walsh (2011) too). Hence the maximum welfare of the economy is achieved when
the original steady state level of unemployment is maintained. This observation
directly a¤ects monetary policy, because strength of the response to unemployment
in the interest rate rule depends on how far the level of unemployment is from its
steady state value. Indeed, we will see this particular feature later in the paper.
3.2.5 Calibration and Solution
We analytically solve for the steady state (showed in appendix) since we have the
same number of variables and equations and use those values for simulating the
4For review of the welfare approximation techniques see Kim and Kim (2003).
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model. We also obtained closed form solution for the optimal monetary policy
regime.
We assume the period to be one quarter long and set the discount factor to
 = 0:99. It is the same as showed in Ravenna and Walsh (2011). The bargaining
power parameter  is set to be equal to 0:5 because there are no direct evidence
of a di¤erent estimate. Then we follow Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011)
and set matching parameters & = 0:76 and  = 0:5 to satisfy Hosios condition.
Value of constant (&) in the Cobb-Douglas matching function is consistent with
Hall (2003) estimate. Steady state productivity is normalized to 1 and we take
the values of rms repayment probability , cost of posting vacancy k and an
unemployment benet a from Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) calibration.
Price adjustment probability $ is taken to be standard and equal to 0:25 together
with price elasticity parameter " = 6 (Basu and Fernald (1997)) and we take this
value from Ravenna and Walsh (2011). We take relative risk aversion  to a have
its usual value (for instance Ravenna and Walsh (2011)) and set it be equal to 2:
Finally, we set persistence parameters of shocks being 0:75 to smooth the impulse
response functions. All the values are summarized in the table 1.
79
Table 3.1. Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
 Householdsdiscount factor 0:99
 Workersbargaining power 0:5
" Price elasticity parameter 6
& Matching parameter 0:76
 Probability of match separation 0:05
k Cost of posting vacancy 0:598
a Workers unemployment benet 0:5
z Productivity 1:0
 Probability that rm will repay its debt 0:86
$ Probability that price will not change 0:25
 Relative risk aversion 2:0
 Matching parameter (elasticity) 0:5
 Financial market shock persistence 0:75
z Productivity shock persistence 0:75
We solve the model by taking log-linear approximation around the local and
deterministic steady state. We also assume that shocks are small enough and they
occur in the neighborhood of the steady state and therefore equilibrium conditions
are satised.
3.3 Monetary Policy
In this section we investigate possible policy makers reaction to the nancial and
labour market shocks. It is structured as follows. Firstly, we present the benchmark
model without policy, secondly, we introduce a couple of policy rules in spirit of
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Taylor (1993), then we investigate the optimal monetary policy and lastly we
rank monetary policy regimes according to the welfare measure in Benigno and
Woodford (2005) framework.
3.3.1 Monetary Policy Rules
We consider the following monetary policy (Taylor 1993 type) rules: (1) Ination
and consumption response, (2) Ination and unemployment response, (3) Ination
and rms borrowing response. For comparison purposes we also consider the op-
timal monetary policy regime. The reason, why in the rst policy rule we have
chosen consumption response instead of output (as in the case of the usual Taylor
rule) is the fact that from the production function (3.11) we can see that output is
equal to Nt - number of employed agents. Hence by targeting output we would be
indirectly targeting unemployment which is the same as the second policy regime.
For this reason we substituted output with consumption in the rst policy rule.
There are a couple of reasons why we have chosen these particular policy rules.
Firstly, similar regimes were considered in the literature5 hence by using similar
expressions we can compare ndings. Secondly, we consider rules with labour
and nancial markets targeting. These are the main sources of instability in our
model and there is some empirical evidence6 of currently adopted aggregate level
of unemployment targeting.
To investigate the central bank preferences towards the target variables in the
monetary policy rules, we search numerically for the values which would give the
highest welfare. We consider all the parameters in the intervals where Blanchard-
Kahn (1980) conditions are satised. That is we set interest rate smoothing pa-
5For instance, Faia (2008 and 2009), Thomas (2008) and more recently Proano (2012).
6For example, forward guidance concept introduced by Bank of England which includes
unemployment level into policy targets.
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rameter i in the interval of (0; 1), ination preference parameter in the interval
of (1:1; 8); unemployment preference parameter in the interval of (0; 8) and rms
borrowing preference parameters in the range of (0; 2).
In the case of all three policy rules we searched for the parameter values that
would give the highest welfare (introduced in the next chapter). Similarly to Faia
(2008) we have found that interest rate smoothing does not increase welfare, that
is, highest welfare in all three regimes is obtained when i = 0:
Other parameter values that we received from searching the highest welfare are
provided in the table below. We use them to compute impulse response functions
and compare monetary policy regimes. Intuitively we can see that in any case
policy maker can set his preference parameter to zero and come back to the ination
only targeting rule. However, this is not optimal choice.
Table 3.2. Monetary Policy Rules and Parameter Values
Policy Functional Form Parameter Values
1 bit = (1  i)bt + Y bCt+ ibit 1 i = 0,  = 3:99, C = 6:03,
2. bit = (1  i) (bt + ubut) + ibit 1 i = 0,  = 1:69, u = 7:37;
3. bit = (1  i)bt + bbbt+ ibit 1 i = 0,  = 1:1, b = 0:44.
3.3.2 Relation Between Financial and Labour Market
To illustrate the channel through which nancial market inuences labour market
we computed steady state wage and unemployment for di¤erent values of borrowing
parameter : As we can see, higher value of  reduces unemployment and increases
wage. We can distinguish two cases. Firstly, if  has a very high value, then rms
can easily issue more debt thus decreasing bargaining surplus and wage. As a
result, unemployment falls (as we see in gure 3). However, due to decrease in
unemployment it is harder for rms to nd the right match and thus they are
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forced to increase wage.
Secondly, if  has very low value, rms cannot access nancial market and
thus borrowing is very low and therefore bargaining surplus is large. Because of
this, wages paid to workers are high too. As a result of high wage, unemployment
increase as we see from gure 3. Since unemployment is high, rms can reduce the
wage because it is easy to nd a match. This is also shown in gure 3.
Figure 3.4 Financial and Labour Markets
It is noteworthy that such relation between wage and unemployment is also
found in some empirical studies, such as Apergis (2008) which examines 10 di¤erent
OECD countries in period 1995-2005 and nd that wages decrease as unemploy-
ment increases. In addition, our result suggest that less stringent rms borrowing
constraint (higher value of ) reduces unemployment which agrees with Acemoglu
(2001) remark that easier access to nancial market may reduce unemployment.
In the next section we compute impulse response functions to illustrate how this
mechanism work in more detail.
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3.3.3 Response to Financial Market Shock
To begin with, we can see that the shock to the repayment probability causes a
signicant increase in unemployment and a huge drop in rmsborrowing. This
is intuitive, because as the repayment probability drops, less loans are issued.
Vacancy lling probability (qt) is a¤ected through the same channel. As borrowing
drops, rmsstart laying o¤ labour force. This results in an increase in the vacancy
lling probability because there are more available workers than vacancies hence
it is is easier for the rm to nd the right match for the posted vacancy.
We can see that the optimal monetary policy is the least volatile as compared
to the other regimes. The closest one to it is the policy rule with response to the
labour market. As expected, it results in the lowest volatility in the labour market
variables (such as unemployment and probability that vacancy will be lled).
Figure 3.5. Impulse Response Functions to Repayment Probability Shock (I)
From Figure 3.5 we can see that the drop in borrowing makes labour market
more exible, because there are more empty vacancies than before the shock (in
the top left panel in Figure 3.5 we can see the drop in the labour market tightness).
It is straightforward to see that output also falls because the decrease in borrowing
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causes the drop in production and also demand for nal goods. Bargaining surplus,
however, increases because of an increase in the level of unemployment.
It is worth noting, that interest rate expose only minor downward trend in all
the regimes except the case with the nancial market response (as seen from Fig-
ures 3.5 top right panel) but ination, in all of the cases (except optimal policy
and borrowing targeting), falls. The reason for it is intuitive: as borrowing falls,
there are less money in the economy and hence ination falls. The sharpest de-
crease in ination is seen in case of the policy rule with response to unemployment
(Figure 3.6 bottom right panel). The explanation for that is the fall in the level of
borrowing (Figure 3.5 bottom left panel) due to the negative nancial shock.
Figure 3.6. Impulse Response Functions to Repayment Probability Shock (II)
To put it in a nutshell, it is clear that the optimal monetary policy is the least
volatile regime as compared to the others. Moreover, movements in interest rate
and ination directly depends on the changes in borrowing caused by the shock in
t.
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3.3.4 Response to Productivity Shock
Contrary to the response to the nancial shock, models reaction to the change
in productivity causes an increase in output and employment, as it could be seen
from Figures 3.7 and 3.8 below.
However, di¤erent policies cause di¤erent behavior of the key variables. For
instance, in Figure 3.7 we can see that the policy rule with response to unemploy-
ment and ination causes the lowest volatility of employment as compared to the
other rules. We can also see that it increases interest rate. The intuitive reason
for that is the policy makers willingness to reduce a jump in borrowing (bottom
left panel in Figure 3.7) by raising interest rates.
For example, consider the rule with the response to ination and consumption.
We see that interest rate decrease because of the drop in vacancy lling probability
(the bottom right panel in Figure 3.7). This, as a result causes downward trend
in ination which we see in Figure 3.8.
It is clear, that an increase in productivity causes decrease in unemployment
because rms require more labour force to meet an increase in the level of aggregate
demand. Further to it, as there are more rms taking loans (to nance their
expansion and hire more workers), borrowing becomes cheaper and interest rate
falls (except the case of response to ination and unemployment). This is somehow
counter intuitive, because in this case borrowing should become more expensive.
However, this e¤ect is mitigated by the drop in interest rate. Lastly, rms start
hiring more workers and therefore vacancy lling probability falls as there are less
unemployed agents and rms have smaller number of unemployed agents to choose
from.
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Figure 3.7. Impulse Response Functions to Productivity Shock (I)
From Figure 3.8 we can see that the productivity shock causes an increase in
the labour market tightness (because increase in employment decreased number
of available vacancies) and a jump in both output and bargaining surplus. It is
consistent with the jump in the nancial market because in our model rms borrow
against their expected prot (surplus) which has increased and therefore rms are
able to obtain more credit.
Figure 3.8. Impulse Response Functions to Productivity Shock (II)
To summarize, we can see that the rule with response to ination and unemploy-
ment causes the smallest volatility of most of the variables and in this sense is the
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closest one to optimal policy. Our model generates very similar dynamic responses
to those showed in Faia (2008, 2009), Proano (2012) or Ravenna and Walsh (2011).
In the following chapter we are going to compute unconditional welfare measure
and rank policy rules accordingly and investigate how policy makers preferences
may a¤ect welfare.
3.4 Welfare Implications
In this section we compute the welfare measure using Benigno andWoodford (2005)
methodology and rank the policy rules according to their performance as it is
suggested in Damjanovic et. al (2011).
We assume that the policy maker commits to the one monetary policy regime
and never changes his mind. It is noteworthy, that welfare is computed in steady
state therefore it does not depend on the realization of shocks. Welfare could be
calculated by using a matrix of the second order moments. This is exactly what
we are going to do.
To compute unconditional welfare, certain steps must be followed. Firstly, we
have to write our model in VAR form. Then, we apply Benigno and Woodford
(2005) algorithm and compute second order approximation (see Kim and Kim
(2003) for review of spurious welfare calculations based on rst-order approxima-
tion) around the steady state. Thirdly, we compute covariance matrix which is
used to obtain the welfare measure.
We present linearized model equations of interest in vector autoregressive form
below. Our system consists of 12 constraints and the household utility function
(equation (3.1)). In order to simplify computations we substitute Phillips curve
with the three additional equations as showed in 2:6 subsection. The constraints
are denoted as equations 3.22, 3.29, 3.28, 3.84, 3.85, 3.86, 3.10, ??, 3.18, ??, 3.11
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and 3.19. The system could be written as
F1 = S bSt   S bSt+1  (1  )   pE+ bibbFt 1 +bit 1   bt
 bbbt + SbpEt pE   zX zt   bXt ;
F2 =
bbt +bit   bt+1  t + bSt+1;
F3 =  k
q
(bqt) bbtb  (1  )S bSt+1;
F4 = bit   bt+1 +  bCt    bCt+1;
F5 = Y bYt   C bCt   aN bNt   k (1  (1  )N) bt + k (1  )N bNt 1;
F6 = bpEt + 1  bqt;
F7 = bpEt   bt;
F8 = bYt    bNt + zt ;
F9 = bNt   bNt 1  pE   1 (1  ) + abt;
F10 = $bit +$ bKt+1 +$ ("  1) bt+1 + bYt (1 $)  bKt;
F11 = (1 $)
bYt   bXt+$ bZt+1 +$"bt+1 +$bit   bZt;
F12 =
$
1 $bt + bKt   bZt:
More concisely we can write the system in matrix form as
ZWt+1 = AZ
W
t +B"t+1; (3.40)
where ZWt+1 is a vector of endogenous variables, "t+1 is a vector of exogenous shocks
and matrices A and B are coe¢ cient matrices. Our aim is to construct variance-
covariance matrix which could be denoted as
SWt = Et
1P
t=0
ZWt+1Z
W 0
t+1: (3.41)
Lets assume, that ZWt = 0, then equation (3.40) immediately becomes
ZWt+1 = B"t+1 (3.42)
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substituting it in our variance-covariance matrix expression we obtain
SWt = EtB"t+1"
0
t+1B
0 (3.43)
Now we denote covariance matrix of exogenous shocks as 


 = "t+1"
0
t+1: (3.44)
Then we continue in the same manner and obtain expression for ZWt+2
ZWt+2 = AZ
W
t+1 +B"t+2: (3.45)
Computing SWt+2 yields
SWt+2 =
 
AZWt+1 +B"t+2
  
AZWt+1 +B"t+2
0
; (3.46)
which could be expanded to
SWt+2 = AZ
W
t+1Z
W 0
t+1A
0 + 2AZW 0t+1"
0
t+2B
0 +B"t+2"0t+2B
0: (3.47)
Since the endogenous variables and the exogenous shocks are uncorrelated, 2AZW 0t+1"
0
t+2B
0
is equal to zero. Thus we can write it as
SWt+2 = AZ
W
t+1Z
W 0
t+1A
0 +B
B0: (3.48)
We assume that ZW is always equal to B" because we have started at the point
ZWt = 0. Therefore we can always substitute Z
W
t with B". Then our variance-
covariance matrix for the subsequent periods becomes sum of A which is a matrix
of coe¢ cients
SWt+k+1 =
1P
s=0
AsB
B0A0s: (3.49)
To compute the sum, recall that St = Et
1P
t=0
t+1ZWt+1Z
W 0
t+1. Therefore rewriting
equation above yields
SWt = Et
1P
t=0
ZWt+1Z
W 0
t+1 = Et
1P
t=0
t+1

tP
s=0
AsB
B0A0s

: (3.50)
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Hence our SWt is equal to the double sum
SWt = Et
 1P
s=0
AsB
B0A0s
 1P
t=s
t+1: (3.51)
Since we know that
1P
t=s
t+1 = 1
(1 )
7, simplication of the above equation yields
SWt = Et
 1P
s=0
AsB
B0A0s

s+1
(1  ) : (3.52)
Lastly, for the sake of simplicity we dene matrix D = B
B0 
(1 ) and matrix
C = A
p
. Therefore the nal sum becomes
SWt = Et
1P
s=0
CsDC 0s: (3.53)
When matrix SWt is computed, we substituted its values to the second order
welfare approximation to the linear system (second order approximation is provided
in the appendix) and sum it all up. The general expression (Benigno andWoodford
2005) is given by
Wt =
1P
t=0
Ft + t:i:p:+O
3: (3.54)
where Ft is the objective function (approximated to the second order), t:i:p: are
terms independent of policy and O3 are terms of the higher order which can be
disregarded. In our case policy maker aims to minimize loss of the welfare, therefore
the objective function is given by the following sum
Ft = Ut +
1P
t=0
 tS
W
t : (3.55)
7Firstly, we multiply both sides by (1  ). This gives us (1  )
1P
t=s
t+1 =
(1  )  1 + 2 + 3 + :::+ t+1. Expanding it we get 1P
t=s
t+1 (1  ) = 
1 + 2 + 3 + :::+ t+1
   1 + 2 + 3 + :::+ t+1, simplifying 1P
t=s
t+1 (1  ) = 1 t+2.
Thus the sum is equal to
1P
t=s
t+1 = 1 
t+2
(1 ) . If we take a limit of  as t ! 1, we obtain
1P
t=s
t+1 = 1(1 ) since limt!1
t+2 = 0:
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Household utility is denoted by Ut, SWt are constraints presented in the linear
system and  t are corresponding Lagrange multipliers from the policy makers
optimization problem showed in appendix.
We use this algorithm to compute welfare under four di¤erent monetary policy
regimes and rank policy rules according to the welfare loss. In addition, we compare
each monetary regime with the optimal policy in terms of consumption equivalence.
Since the consumption equivalence shows how much consumption when in the
optimal policy regime agents are willing to give up to be as good as in other
regime, we can write the following denition based on the utility function (3.1)
W 0 = x1 W P ; (3.56)
where WO is welfare measure in optimal policy regime, W P is welfare in any other
regime, x is dened as consumption equivalence. Then x is given by
x =

W 0
W P
 1
1 
: (3.57)
And this is the consumption equivalence we used in the table below expressed in
the percentage terms.
Table 3.3. Monetary Policy Rules and Welfare
Policy Welfare Consumption Equivalence
Ination and Consumption Targeting  4:949 1:104%
Ination and Unemployment Targeting  4:925 0:612%
Ination and Borrowing Targeting  4:951 1:137%
Optimal policy  4:895  
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It is clear that the best performance in terms of welfare is delivered by the
optimal policy. The closest one to it is the rule with response to ination and
unemployment.
Now we can use results from the grid search algorithm and plot the all three
policy rules against squared welfare measure on y axis and number of all the
possible combinations of parameter values on x axis. We can see from the gure
3.8 that the policy rule with response to unemployment causes smallest losses for
any reasonable parameter values. In other words, if the policy maker decides to
use interest rate rule with unemployment targeting, it will give higher welfare for
any reasonable parameter values. This conrms the result provided in table 3.
Figure 3.8. Policy Rules for Various Parameter Values
3.4.1 Should Response to Labour Market be Positive?
In the previous literature (for example Faia (2008) and Proano (2012)) it was
pointed out that the aggregate level of unemployment should be positively targeted
in the interest rate rule. In this section we show that sign next to unemployment
targeting in the Taylor rule (as showed in Table 2) depends on the size of bargaining
power.
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To begin with, we conducted a numerical experiment where we have set pa-
rameter u to be equal either to 2 or  2 for the same value of . As we can
see from Figure 11 below, if workers bargaining power is moderate that is, if
 2 (0:2; 0:55)8 then the positive response gives higher welfare, whereas in the
case of  2 (0:55; 0:99) the negative response gives higher welfare. Now we can
formalize this result.
Result: Sign next to the unemployment reaction coe¢ cient (assuming the
same numerical value) in the Taylor rule depends on the size of the workers bargain-
ing power. That is, if  2 (0:2; 0:55) reaction should be positive, if  2 (0:55; 0:99)
reaction should be negative to obtain the highest level of the welfare measure.
From equation (??) we know that pEt = (qt)
  
1  &

1  , which we can substitute
into surplus equation (3.22):
St =
zt
Xt
  a+ bt   bt 1
t
it 1 + (1  )EtSt+1    (qt) 

1  &

1 EtSt+1:
Di¤erentiate it with respect to St+1
@St
@St+1
= (1  )    (qt) 

1  &

1  : (3.58)
Expression above shows that the e¤ect of the labour market changes (qt) on surplus
depends on the size of workers bargaining power. If  is small, then the e¤ect will
be very little since qt falls because of the labour market contraction. If  is large,
then the negative e¤ect on surplus will be much higher, i.e. decrease in surplus
is much larger when  is large. Therefore in the case of  2 (0:2; 0:55) even the
positive response to unemployment can increase welfare. When  2 (0:2; 0:55)
response should be negative because in this case raise in unemployment will lower
interest rates and borrowing will become cheaper.
8Workers bargaining power parameter has the values between 0 and 1 but if it is lower than
0:2; Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions are not satised. Therefore we restrict it to be in range
of 0:2 : 1:
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Figure 3.9. Welfare and Bargaining Power
Intuition of this result could be summarized as follows. To begin with, we see
that rms borrow against their future prot (surplus) as shown in equation (3.29).
When the nancial shock occurs, borrowing drops. Surplus, however, is a¤ected
through expected surplus and borrowing. As we have showed earlier, if workers
have a lot of bargaining power, then they take most of the surplus. When the
nancial shock is present, the drop in surplus is reinforced and hence future bor-
rowing is a¤ected. Therefore the policy maker should signicantly reduce interest
rate to make borrowing much cheaper. Then it follows that higher bargaining
power implies negative reaction to unemployment in the Taylor rule and in the
case of low bargaining power - positive response to unemployment.
3.4.2 Policy Makers Preferences and Welfare
In each of the monetary policy regimes (except the optimal policy) government
faces a trade-o¤ because it aims to minimize variance of at least two variables.
Since we have found out that the interest rate smoothing is welfare detrimental, we
set parameter i to zero and compute welfare measure for each value of parameters
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 and u in the second policy regime (unemployment targeting). The resulting
shape is provided below.
Figure 3.10. Rule 2, Ination and Unemployment
As we can see, the highest welfare is obtained when policy maker has very
strong response to unemployment. However, moderate response could be welfare
detrimental as compared to very minor response which could give higher welfare.
Interestingly we see that high response to ination does not guarantee high welfare
as it is usually the case in New-Keynesian models. The reason for that could
be source of frictions. In our model they come from imperfect labour market.
Therefore monetary policy which reacts to both ination and unemployment is
better than just plain ination targeting.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented economy with labour and nancial market frictions.
We have used matching model (Pissarides 1987) to account for the imperfections in
the labour market and introduced rmsnancial market which let us investigate
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the relation between rmsborrowing and the aggregate level of unemployment.
Further to this, we have derived the optimal policy reaction to the repayment
probability and productivity shocks. Then we have introduced 3 di¤erent Taylor
type monetary policy rules and ranked them according to the welfare measure
which was computed using Beningno and Woodford (2005) methodology. The key
ndings could be summarized as follows.
Firstly, we have found that the monetary policy rule with response to ina-
tion and labour market frictions (the aggregate level of unemployment) performs
closest to the optimal rule in terms of the welfare measure and the consumption
equivalence. Further to this, we also showed that targeting the aggregate level of
borrowing (rms nancial market) may slightly increase welfare too.
Secondly, we have showed that the sign of the labour market reaction parameter
in the interest rate rule depends on the size of workers bargaining power. That
is, if workers have very little bargaining power then reaction should be positive,
if workers have high bargaining power, then reaction should be negative to obtain
the highest value of welfare measure.
Thirdly, we have investigated how presence of the nancial frictions (changes
in rms repayment probability) and changes in productivity can a¤ect labour
market and the level of unemployment and thus output. We have showed that the
fall in rms borrowing can directly a¤ect labour market and cause an increase in
unemployment.
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3.6 Appendix
Linearization of model equations around zero ination steady state yields the fol-
lowing results.
3.6.1 Benchmark Model
Linearized Model without Policy
Bargaining surplus
S bSt = z
X

zt   bXt+ S bSt+1  (1  )   pE+ bbbt
 SbpEt pE   bibbt 1 +bit 1   bt : (3.59)
Firmsborrowing constraint
bSt+1 = t   bbt +bit   bt+1 : (3.60)
Firmsborrowing and labour market (qt) relation
bbtb =  k
q
(bqt)  (1  )S bSt+1: (3.61)
Interest rate and consumption relation
bit = bt+1 +  bCt+1    bCt: (3.62)
Phillips curve
bt+1 =  bXt + bt:
Output and Employment
Y bYt = C bCt + aN bNt + k (1  (1  )N) bt   k (1  )N bNt 1: (3.63)
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Probability that worker will nd a job
bpEt =   1  bqt: (3.64)
Employment and labour market tightness
bpEt = bt: (3.65)
Final good production bYt = bNt + zt: (3.66)
Number of employed agents
bNt = bNt 1  pE   1 (1  )  abt: (3.67)
Corresponding Steady State
z
X
= a+
 
(1  )(1  ) + 1 + pE   (1  )S;
k
q
=  (+ 1) (1  )S;
b = (1  )S;
K =
"
"  1Z;
K =
Nz
1 $ ;
X =
"
"  1 ;
N (z   a+ k(1  )) = C   a+ k;
pE = (q) 

1  &
1
1  ;
pEt = & (t)
 ; 
+ pE(1  )N = pE:
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3.6.2 Policy Makers Optimization Problem
Government maximizes household utility subject to behavioral constraints. It
could be formally written as Lagrange optimization problem:
L = Et
1X
t=0
t
26666666666666666666666666666666666666664
C1 t
1 
+ 1;t

St   ztXt + a+ bt 1
it 1
t
  bt   (1  )St+1 + pEt St+1

+ 2;t

bt
it
Et+1
  (1  )St+1

+ 3;t

k
qt
  bt   (1  )St+1

+ 4;t
h
1 $" 1t
1 $
i 1
1 "
Kt   "" 1Zt

+ 5;t

Kt   Yt  $ 1it" 1t+1Kt+1

+ 6;t

Zt   Yt 1Xt  $ 1it"t+1Zt+1

+ 7;t

it   C
 
t
C t+1
t+1

+ 8;t (Yt   Ct + a(1 Nt)  kt (1  (1  )Nt 1))
+ 9;t

pEt   (qt) 

1  &
1
1 

+ 10;t
 
pEt   & (t)

+ 11;t (Yt  Ntzt)
+ 12;t (Nt   (1  )Nt 1   &t (1  (1  )Nt 1)
37777777777777777777777777777777777777775
:
which has the following rst order conditions:
100
@L
@it
=  1;t+1
bt
t+1
it +  2;t
bt
t+1
it +  5;t$
1
it
" 1t+1Kt+1 +  6;t$
1
it
"t+1Zt+1 +  7;tit;
@L
@Zt
=   4;t "
"  1 +  6;t    6;t 1$
1
it 1
"t ;
@L
@Nt
=   8;ta+  8;t+1 (1  ) kt+1    11;tzt +  12;t
  12;t+1(1  ) +  12;t+1pEt+1(1  );
@L
@St
=  1;t    1;t 1(1  ) + pEt 1 1;t 1    2;t 1
t

(1  )   3;t 1(1  );
@L
@Ct
Ct = C
1 
t +  7;t
C t
C t+1
t+1    7;t 1

C t 1
C t
t    8;tCt;
@L
@Xt
Xt =  1;t
zt
Xt
+  6;t
Yt
Xt
;
@L
@bFt
=  1;t+1
it
t+1
   1;t +  2;t it
t+1
   3;t;
@L
@pEt
=  1;tSt+1 +  9;t +  10;t;
@L
@qt
qt =   3;t k
qt
+  9;t


1  

pEt ;
@L
@Yt
=   5;t    6;t 1
Xt
+  8;t +  11;t;
@L
@Kt
=  4;t

1 $" 1t
1 $
 1
1 "
+  5;t    5;t 1$ 1
it 1
" 1t ;
@L
@t
t =   1;tbt 1 it 1
t
   2;t 1 bt 1it 1
t
   5;t 1 $
it 1
("  1) " 1t Kt    6;t 1
$

"
it 1
"tZt
  7;t 1 1

C t 1
C t
t +  4;t

$
1 $

" 1t

1 $" 1 t
1 $
 "
1 "
Kt;
@L
@t
t =   8;tk (1  (1  )Nt 1) t    10;tpEt    12;tpEt (1  (1  )Nt 1):
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Linearization of Policy Makers FOC
@L
@it
it =  1b
b 1;t+1 +bbt   bt+1 +bit+ 1

 2b
b 2;t +bbt   bt+1 +bit
+ 6$Z
b 6;t  bit + "bt+1 + bZt+1+  7 b 7;t +bit
+ 5$K
b 5;t  bit + ("  1) bt+1 + bKt+1 ;
@L
@Zt
=   4 "
"  1
b 4;t +  6b 6;t    6$  6;t 1  bit 1 + "bt ;
@L
@Nt
=   8ab 8;t +  8 (1  ) k bt+1 + b 8;t+1  z 11 b 11;t + bzt+  12b 12;t
  12(1  )
 
1  pEt+1
 b 12;t+1 +  12(1  )pEbpEt+1;
@L
@St
=  1b 1;t    1 (1  )  pEt 1 b 1;t 1 +  1pEbpEt 1
 

(1  ) 2
b 2;t 1 + bt   3(1  )b 3;t 1;
@L
@Ct
Ct = C
1  (1  ) bCt +  7 b 7;t +   bCt+1   bCt+ bt+1
  7

b 7;t 1 +   bCt   bCt 1+ bt  C 8 b 8;t + bCt ;
@L
@Xt
Xt =
b 1;t + bzt  b 6;t + bYt ;
@L
@bFt
=  1 ( 1;t+1 + it   t+1)   1b 1;t +  2

b 2;t   bt+1 +bit   3b 3;t;
@L
@pEt
=  1S
b 1;t + bSt+1+  9b 9;t +  10b 10;t;
@L
@Kt
=  4
b 4;t + $
1 $bt

+  5b 5;t    5$ b 5;t 1  bit 1 + ("  1) bt ;
@L
@t
t =  b 1

b 1;t 1 1 +   1 1

   2

bbbt 1 +   1b   2 b

+  6$"Z
bit 1 1

+

  5$ ("  1) +  4

$
1 $

K bKt    6$"Z bZt
+

$
1 $

Kb 4;t 4   1

b 7;t 1 7  $"Zb 6;t 1 6    7

bCt
+ 7
1

 bCt 1  $ ("  1)Kb 5;t 1 5   bb 2;t 1 2
+
0B@  1b 1 +  2b 1    5$ ("  1) ("  1)K    6$"2Z    7 1
+ 4
 
$
1 $

("  1)K    4
 
$
1 $

"K $
1 $
1CAbt;
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@L
@t
t =   8k

(1  (1  )N)
b 8;t + bt N (1  ) bNt 1   10pE b 10;t + bpEt 
  12pE
h
(1  (1  )N)
b 12;t + bpEt  N(1  ) bNt 1i ;
@L
@Yt
=   5b 5;t    6
X
b 6;t   bXt+  8b 8;t +  11b 11;t;
@L
@qt
qt =  
b 3;t   bqt+ b 9;t + bpEt  :
Steady State Solution for Policy Makers FOC
Firstly, we rewrite FOCs with steady state values (obtained from steady state
constraints solution), that is we use  = 1 and i = 1

:
@L
@it
it =  1b   2b= +  5$XZ +  6$Z +  7;
@L
@Zt
=   4X +  6 (1 $) ;
@L
@Nt
=  8 ( (1  ) k   a)   11z +  12
 
1  (1  ) + (1  )pE ;
@L
@St
=
 
+ pE

 1    2

(1  )   3(1  );
@L
@Ct
Ct = C
1  +  7

1  1


   8C;
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@L
@Xt
Xt = z 1 + Y  6;
@L
@bt
=  2
1

   3;
@L
@pEt
=  1S +  9 +  10;
@L
@t
t =   1b= +  2b=2    5$ ("  1)K    6$"Z
  7 1

+  4

$
1 $

K;
@L
@t
t =   8k (1  (1  )N)     10pE    12aspE (1  (1  )N);
@L
@Kt
=  4 +  5 (1 $) ;
@L
@Yt
=   5    6 1
X
+  8 +  11;
@L
@qt
qt =   3k
q
+  9


1  

pE:
Then we use the following identities to simplify FOC
 2
1

=  3;
  1
N
=  6;
K = XZ;
 4 =    1
NX
(1 $) :
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Which results in the reduced system
@L
@it
it =  1b   3b+  5$XZ    1
N
$Z +  7;
@L
@Nt
=  8 ( (1  ) k   a)   11z +  12
 
1  (1  ) + (1  )pE ;
@L
@St
=
 
+ pE

 1 +  3(1  ) (+ 1) ;
@L
@Ct
Ct = C
1  +  7

1  1


   8C;
@L
@pEt
=  1S +  9 +  10;
@L
@qt
qt =   3k
q
+  9


1  

pE;
@L
@Yt
=   5 +  1 1
NX
+  8 +  11;
@L
@Kt
=    1
NX
(1 $) +  5 (1 $) ;
@L
@t
t =   1b= +  3b=    5$"Z +  1
N
$"Z    7 1

   1$
N
Z;
@L
@t
t =   8k (1  (1  )N)     10pE    12pE (1  (1  )N):
To simplify it further we use
 5 =
 1
NX
;
and then observe that FOC @L
@t
t becomes tautology. From @L@Yt then we can deduce
 11 =   8:
So our FOC becomes
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@L
@it
it =  1b   3b+  7;
@L
@Nt
=  8 ( (1  ) k   a) +  8z +  12
 
1  (1  ) + (1  )pE ;
@L
@St
=
 
+ pE

 1 +  3(1  ) (+ 1) ;
@L
@Ct
Ct = C
1  +  7

1  1


   8C;
@L
@pEt
=  1S +  9 +  10;
@L
@qt
qt =   3k
q
+  9


1  

pE;
@L
@t
t =   8k (1  (1  )N)     10pE    12pE (1  (1  )N):
This system is solvable because it has the same number of equations as number of
unknown Lagrange multipliers.
3.6.3 Derivation of Wage Equation
Firstly, consider equation (3.26) that denes value of the lled vacancy. By using
borrowing constraint (3.29) to eliminate bt and by employing vacancy posting
condition Qt = kqt we obtain the following expression
Et [St+1] =
k
qt(1  )

t

t+1
it
2
+ 
 : (3.68)
Now we use expression for bargaining surplus (3.22) and substitute bt from (3.29):
St =
z
Xt
  a  bt 1
t
it 1 +

t+1
it
t(1  ) +
 
(1  )  pEt



Et [St+1] :
Substitution of Et [St+1] from (3.68) yields
St =
z
Xt
  a  bt 1
t
it 1 +
k

t+1
it
t(1  ) +
 
(1  )  pEt



qt(1  )

t

t+1
it
2
+ 
 : (3.69)
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Next, consider the net value of a worker given by Vt   Ut (equations (3.23) and
(3.24)):
Vt   Ut = wt   a+ 
 
1    pEt

(Vt+1   Ut+1) ; (3.70)
since we know that Vt   Ut = St, we can use it to simplify the expression above
St = wt   a+ 
 
1    pEt

Et [St+1] :
Now, use equation (3.68) to eliminate Et [St+1]
St = wt   a+
k
 
1    pEt


qt(1  )

t

t+1
it
2
+ 
 : (3.71)
Lastly, combining expressions 3.69 and 3.71 and solving for wage we obtain
wt = (1  ) a+ 

z
Xt
  bt 1
t
it 1

+
k
h
t+1
it
t + p
E
t 
i
qt

t

t+1
it
2
+ 
 ; (3.72)
which is the same as provided in the text.
Second Order Welfare Approximation
To compare welfare under di¤erent monetary policy regimes we compute second
order approximation using Benigno and Woodfor (2005). It could be done by
applying the following formula to policy makers optimization problem:
S(Xt; Yt) =
@S2
@2X
X2 bX2t + @S2@2Y Y 2bY 2t + 2 @S2@Y @XY X bYt bXt; (3.73)
where St is the constraint in a policy makers Lagrange equation. Then welfare
could be represented as a sum of approximated constraints and Lagrange multipli-
ers
W =
1P
t=0
t tSt: (3.74)
Applying Beningo and Woodford algorithm we obtain the following system
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SW0 =  C 1  bC2t ;
SW1 =  2zX bX2t + 2X bXtzbzt + 2bib2t + 2SpE bSt+1bpEt
+2bibbt 1bit 1   2bibbt 1bt   2bibit 1bt;
SW2 = 2bib2t+1 + 2bibbtbit   2ibbbtbt+1   2bibitbt+1   2S(1  )bt bSt+1;
SW3 =
2k
q
bq2t ;
SW4 =
$
1 $K
 
"
 
$
1 $

+ ("  2) b2t + 2 $1 $K bKtbt;
SW5 =  $ (" 1)(" 2)i Kb2t+1   2$ 1iKbi2t + 2$ (" 1)i Kbitbt+1
+$ 2
i
bit bKt+1K   2$   " 1i K bKt+1bt+1;
SW6 =  $ "(" 1)i Zb2t+1   2$ 1iZbi2t + 2 YX bYt bXt   2YX bX2t ;
+2$ "
bit
i
bt+1Z   2$ "i bZt+1Zbt+1 + 2$ 1i bZt+1Zbit;
SW7 =  (    1) bC2t    (   1) bC2t+1 + 22 bCt bCt+1 + 2 bCtbt+1   2 bCt+1bt+1;
SW8 = 2k (1  )Nbt bNt 1;
SW9 =   1 
 
1
1 

q
 2
1 +2&
1
1  bq2t ;
SW10 =  & (  1) () b2t ;
SW11 =  2Nz bNtbzt;
SW12 =  & (  1)  (1  (1  )N)b2t + 2&N(1  )bt bNt 1:
which we use to compare di¤erent policy rules.
3.6.4 Derivation of Final Good Producers Price Setting
Relation
Here we show derivation of Phillips curve. The nal good producersprot maxi-
mization problem could be written as follows
t(i) =

pt (i)
Pt
  P
w
t
Pt

pt (i)
Pt
 "
Y ft : (3.75)
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For the sake of simplicity we can substitute p

t (i)
Pt+
=
pt (i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+
. Now we rewrite the
optimization problem as
max
pt (i)
Et
1X
=0
$
t+
t

pt (i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+
  P
w
t+
Pt+

pt (i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+
 "
Y ft+ : (3.76)
Di¤erentiating it with respect to p

t (i)
Pt+
gives us the following expression
1X
=0
$
t+
t
0B@ (1  ")

pt (i)
Pt
 " 
Pt
Pt+
1 "
Y ft+
+"
Pwt+
Pt+

pt (i)
Pt
 " 1 
Pt
Pt+
 "
Y ft+
1CA : (3.77)
Then we multiply it by

pt (i)
Pt
"+1
to obtain
1X
=0
$
t+
t
 
(1  ")

pt (i)
Pt

Pt
Pt+
1 "
Y ft+ + "
Pwt+
Pt+

Pt
Pt+
 "
Y ft+
!
:
(3.78)
Now can dene total revenue (Kt) and total cost (Zt) as follows
Kt 
1X
=0
$
t+
t

Pt
Pt+
1 "
Y ft+ ; (3.79)
Zt 
1X
=0
$
t+
t
Pwt+
Pt+

Pt
Pt+
 "
Y ft+ : (3.80)
Now we substitute these denitions into our derivative and arrive at the expression
(1  ")

pt (i)
Pt

Kt + "Zt = 0: (3.81)
Because of the assumption that only proportion of rms could change the prices
every period we know that price index evolves according to the following law of
motion
Pt =
 
$P 1 "t 1 + (1 $)pt (i)1 "
 1
1 " : (3.82)
Rearranging it gives us
pt (i)
Pt
=

1 $" 1t
1 $
 1
1 "
: (3.83)
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Then combining it with equation (2.6) and keeping in mind that " > 1
1 $" 1t
1 $
 1
1 "
Kt =
"
1  "Zt: (3.84)
We need equation above to derive the new Keynesian curve which we are going to
do in the next section.
Phillips Curve
Now lets look again at the equations of total revenue and cost of the nal good
producer. Notice that we dene ratio of average price to wholesale price Pt
Pwt
as a
markup and called it Xt. Recall, that we can rewrite equations (3.79) and (3.80)
as follows
Kt = Yt +$Et

t+1
t
" 1t+1Kt+1

; (3.85)
and
Zt =
Yt
Xt
+$Et

t+1
t
"t+1Zt+1

: (3.86)
Then we linearize two equations above and (3.84) around the steady state to
arrive at the following expressions:
bKt = bZt   $
1 $bt; (3.87)bKt = bY ft (1 $) +$ bKt+1 +$("  1)bt+1 +$bt+1  $bt; (3.88)bZt = (1 $) bY ft   (1 $) bXt (3.89)
+$"bt+1 +$bt+1  $bt +$ bZt+1; (3.90)
where variables with hats denote deviations from the steady state. Lastly, we
substitute them to derive nal goods Phillips curve
bt+1 =  bXt + bt; (3.91)
where  = (1 $)(1 $)
$
: And this is exactly the same expression as it is in the text.
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Table 1. List of Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
 Householdsdiscount factor 0:99
 Workersbargaining power 0:5
" Price elasticity parameter 6
& Matching parameter 0:76
 Probability of match separation 0:05
k Cost of posting vacancy 0:598
a Workers unemployment benet 0:5
z Productivity 1:0
 Probability that rm will repay its debt 0:86
$ Probability that price will not change 0:25
 Relative risk aversion 2:0
 Matching parameter (elasticity) 0:5
 Financial market shock persistence 0:75
z Productivity shock persistence 0:75
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CHAPTER 4
STATIONARITY OF ECONOMETRIC LEARNING WITH
BOUNDED MEMORY
4.1 Introduction1
Econometric learning in macroeconomics is one of the possible extensions of the
rational expectations hypothesis which allows for irrational behavior. However,
certain conditions are imposed. For instance, it is assumed that agents (who are
learning) have access to all the information about some variables evolution over
time. That is, they have an ever-expanding memory. One possible way to tackle
this issue is to put exponentially decreasing weights (the so-called gain) on each
of the observations as in the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm or constant
weight as in the Constant Gain (CG) learning rule as shown in Honkapohja and
Mitra (2003), Evans and Honkapohja (2003) or Barucci (2000 and 2001). However,
in each of these cases it is still assumed that agents have access to every past
observation. In this paper we relax this assumption and consider the bounded
memory OLS learning algorithm with weights of 1 and 0 put on each observation
which is also a special case of the Constant Gain algorithm.
The idea here is simple: agents form their forecasts for the next period by using
only some number T of the past observations. In that sense agents put weight of 1
on each observation within the length of T and 0 on all the other past observations.
Then it follows, that each observation within the range T   1 is equally important
for the next periods forecast and each observation that is outside the range is not
accessible (has 0 weight). This is the very similar to the ordinary CG algorithm.
To the best of our knowledge, the role of memory has been only moderately
1Matlab codes used in this chapter could be seen at https://github.com/Sarunas-
Girdenas/Bounded_Memory.
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analyzed in the framework of OLS learning. Holmes and Manning (1988) nd that
in the non-linear cobweb model with OLS type learning, memory increases stability
and prevents chaotic behavior. However, memory in their case is dened as all the
past information that agents can access. Further to this, Canning (1992) showed
that if agents employ the OLS type of learning and the past does not matter
too muchin the sense that each observation is discounted by 1
t
, then the model
converges to a unique equilibrium that does not depend on the initial conditions.
A very similar result was provided in Bray and Savin (1986). Lastly, LeBaron
(2012) presents a heterogenous agent model where each agent is using CG learning
to obtain the forecast but with a di¤erent realization of the gain parameter  and
argues that it helps to explain a lot of features of the real stock market.
In this paper we aim to study the length of memory in a slightly di¤erent way.
That is, we use classical cobweb model setting and allow agents to access only a
limited amount of observations T instead of all of them with discounting as in the
CG or RLS types of learning. In purely econometric terms the OLS algorithm with
bounded memory could be seen as a rolling window estimate. This setup allows us
to investigate the impact of the memory length on the stability and stationarity
of agentsforecasts.
As shown in Berardi and Galimberti (2013), the OLS type learning algorithm
with the rolling window (bounded memory) could be seen as a special case of the
RLS and CG algorithms with weights of 1 or 0 placed on each observation. The
theoretical discussion of the RLS type of learning with decaying weights is pre-
sented in Evans and Honkapohja (2003), Berardi and Galimberti (2013). For more
detailed survey of econometric learning and cycles see Chevillon and Mavroeidis
(2014). Also there have been some empirical attempts to obtain the numerical
value of the gain parameter using the data, for instance Berardi and Galimberti
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(2014) or Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2008). In this paper we show that
the so-called weight can be derived by assuming that agents are not able to process
all the information from t to t  1 time periods.
The key question which we are aiming to answer in this paper is what are
the properties of the transition matrix of the OLS-type learning with bounded
memory in the cobweb model setting. If the properties were known, then we could
investigate stationarity and convergence of the model. So far we have proved that
for any length of agents memory T the eigenvalues of the transition matrix lie in the
unit circle. We have used this nding to construct analytical proof of stationarity
of price under bounded memory learning. Furthermore, by employing numerical
computations we nd that OLS parameter estimates 2, 2, price pt and expected
price pet have the same mean as rational expectations equilibrium value. However,
at this stage we are unable to provide analytical proof to conrm this nding.
As in Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2008) we nd that bounded memory
increases volatility. For illustrative purposes we use the classical cobweb model
(Kaldor 1934, Ezekiel 1938) framework. However, our results could be easily ex-
tended to any macroeconomic model where agents use the OLS learning algorithm.
This paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we briey introduce the cobweb
model with OLS learning and expanding memory as in Evans and Honkapohja
(2003). Secondly, we formalize the problem of the bounded memory learning.
Thirdly, we investigate properties of the transition matrix of the OLS algorithm
with bounded memory. Lastly, using numerical methods we show that the OLS
estimates are stationary and provide some results. The nal section concludes the
paper.
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4.2 Some Properties of Bounded Memory Learning
In this section we rstly introduce the classical cobweb model with the OLS type
of learning. Then we relax the assumption that agents are able to use all the
observations to form their forecasts.
4.2.1 Learning with Expanding Memory
The cobweb model, as presented by Kaldor (1934) and Ezekiel (1938) denes a
market for one type of good with demand and supply. Ezekiel (1938) stated that
the market price will converge to its equilibrium (REE) if the ratio of the demand
and supply slopes is less than 1. Otherwise it will diverge. In this case we will
analyze only the stable case of the cobweb model which consists of the two key
equations.
Demand:
dt = mI  mppt + v1;t: (4.1)
Supply:
st = rI + rpp
e
t + rwwt 1 + v2;t: (4.2)
where dt is quantity demanded, st is quantity supplied, mI , rI are intercept terms,
parameters mp and rp are greater than 0, v1;t and v2;t capture white noise unob-
served shocks. Here pet denotes expectations of price formed at time t. Notice, that
here we use the same notation as in Evans and Honkapohja (2003). Furthermore,
we follow Bray and Savin (1986) and assume that wt  i:i:d: (0; 2w) and is observed
by the agents. We require this assumption in the latter part of the paper where we
use matrix permutation to show the stationarity of forecasts. By employing the
market clearing condition and solving for the aggregate price level pt we obtain the
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actual law of motion (ALM) of the economy:
pt =  + p
e
t + wt 1 + vt; (4.3)
where  = mI rI
mp
,  =   1
mp
rw,  =   rpmp , vt =
v1;t v2;t
mp
and we know that vt 
i:i:d:
 
0; 2

. For now we assume that they are formed using rational expectations,
in the next part of the paper we will relax this assumption.
Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) pet = Et 1pt is given by
Et 1pt =

1   +

1  wt 1; (4.4)
and is unique because it does not depend on the future price level.
Now we are going to consider the classical OLS-type learning. Assume that
agents (in this case - rms which are trying to forecast the future price level)
are not aware of the ALM (equation 4.3). They form expectations based on the
following Perceived Law of Motion (PLM):
pt = 2;t 1 + 2;t 1wt 1 + t; (4.5)
but they have no information about the value of coe¢ cients 2;t 1 and 2;t 1
and therefore they are using an OLS regression to estimate these values. In the
classical case it is assumed that rms have the data from periods t = 0; 1; ::; t  1
which is summarized in the information set fpt; wtgt 1t=0. In other words, rms use
all the information available up to the current period. Then using the fact that
pt   Et 1pt = t and (4.5) we obtain the price forecast at time period t:
pet = 2;t 1 + 2;t 1wt 1: (4.6)
We can clearly see, that the current period forecast of price level pet depends on the
parameter estimates 2;t 1 and 2;t 1 which are obtained using all the information
up to t  1: Corresponding learning rule (OLS equations) reads as follows:
b2;t 1 = Pt 1t=1 (wt i   wt 1)(pt i   pt 1)Pt 1
t=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
; (4.7)
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b2;t 1 = pt 1   b2;t 1wt 1: (4.8)
Bray and Savin (1986) show that under these assumptions the model is stable
and converges to REE. Furthermore, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) use a Recursive
Stochastic Algorithm (RSA) to show that the estimates almost surely converge to
REE, that is 264 b2b2
375!
264 1 

1 wt 1
375 : (4.9)
In the following section we will investigate stationarity of the price forecast
when agents have bounded memory, that is they are able to use only some amount
of information instead of all of it up to period t   1. We will show that forecasts
are stationary and parameters converge in distribution to REE values even if we
relax the assumption of the number of periods agents use for forecast formation.
4.2.2 Learning with Bounded Memory
One of the rst attempts to investigate bounded memory in terms of econometric
learning are works by Honkapohja and Mitra (2003 and 2006) and Mitra (2005).
However, in all of these cases the CG algorithm was used instead of OLS. We extend
this literature by investigating bounded memory learning in the OLS framework
because it is not possible to represent bounded memory learning in a recursive
manner (RLS) as noted in Honkapohja and Mitra (2003).
To begin with, we rewrite the cobweb model equations for the bounded memory
case. Evolution of the economy is given by:
pt =  + p
e
t + wt 1 + vt: (4.10)
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The rmslearning rule is dened as:
pet = 2;t 1 + 2;t 1wt 1: (4.11)
Two OLS estimates:
b2;t 1 = PTi=1 (wt i   wt 1)(pt i   pt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
; (4.12)
b2;t 1 = pt 1   b2;t 1wt 1; (4.13)
Notice, that here agents can use only a limited number of past observations
T to form their expectations by using OLS. This is the key di¤erence from the
conventional least squares learning and it will drive all our results. Variables with
bar denote the sample mean for T periods as it demonstrated in (4.16).
Our aim is to show that pt is stationary for all T > 0.
The core idea of the proof is simple. Firstly, we have to represent the cobweb
model with bounded memory in terms of a Random Coe¢ cient Model (RCM), sec-
ondly, we use some conditions specied in Conlisk (1974) to prove the stationarity
of such a model and hence price forecasts (in terms of the cobweb model).
Proposition 4.2.1 Consider an economy where expectations are formed as adap-
tive learning with bounded memory as in (4.10), (4.11), (4.12), (4.13). Then the
actual price follows an autoregressive process of order T with random coe¢ cients
as in RCM:
pt =  + 

TP
i=1
Si;tpt i

+ wt 1 + vt; (4.14)
where
Si =
1
T
+
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt i   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
; (4.15)
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and
wt 1 =
1
T
TP
i=1
wt i: (4.16)
4.2.3 Stationarity of Price with Bounded Memory Learn-
ing
To investigate stationarity of the process yt (which captures realized prices pt) we
will use some conditions presented by Conlisk (1974), but the method shall be
modied since some of them are not satised in our case. In particular, Conlisk
(1974) does not allow for autocorrelation of matrixMt which is dened below, but
in our case autocorrelation exists because of the assumptions of the cobweb model.
It is clear that the cobweb model can be represented as RCM of order 1:
yt = "t +Mtyt 1; (4.17)
where yt =
0BBBBBBB@
pt
pt 1
:::
pt T+1
1CCCCCCCA
,Mt =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
S1;t S2;t ::: ST;t
1 0 ::: 0
0 1 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
and "t =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
a+ wt 1 + vt
0
:::
0
0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
:
We begin our investigation of stationarity of the model presented in (4.17) by
setting up an additional property of coe¢ cients Si;t.
Lemma 4.2.2 For any realization of wt and vt;
PT
i=1 S
2
i;t < 1:
Proof. See Appendix.
We need lemma (4.2.2) for the following proposition where we show that the
product of matrices Mt is bounded from above.
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Proposition 4.2.3 For any memory length T , there exists a natural number nT
and a boundary BT such that for any n > nT ; every elements of the product of n
matrices is bounded by BT
n : Y
i=1;n
(Mt i)

ij
< BT
n (4.18)
Proof. See Appendix.
Having established these results, we could investigate the stationarity of yt by
looking at the unconditional expectations E [yty0t].
Conjecture 4.2.4 Process (4.17) is stationary.
Proof. At the moment we are still working on the full proof, but we have a very
strong feeling based on the properties we have already investigated that the process
yt is stationary. We are in the process of nalizing the proof that E [yty0t] < 1
and E

yty
0
t j

< 1 which would lead to a conclusion that the process is indeed
stationary.
4.2.4 Additional Properties of Bounded Memory Learning
In this section we present some additional properties of coe¢ cients Si;t and matrix
Mt. All of the following proposition hold under the assumption that the exogenous
variable wt and shock vt are i:i:d: processes.
The autoregressive coe¢ cients Si;t:have the properties as described in Proposi-
tion 4.2.5:
Proposition 4.2.5 Random coe¢ cients Si;t dened in (4.15) have the following
properties:
i)
PT
i=1 Si;t = 1;
ii) E [Si] > 0;
iii) E [SiSj] > 0:
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Proof. See appendix
It is interesting to note, the rst observation (S1) is the most important one
(has the highest value) whereas all the others have almost the equal size. To
formalize this statement, we rstly have to compute unconditional expectations of
S1 and S2 and then extend the result to a more general case of Si for i > 1.
Lemma 4.2.6 E [S1   S2] = 1T 1 .
Proof. See appendix.
Now we show that for i > 1 all Si have the same unconditional expectations.
Lemma 4.2.7 Unconditional expectations of S1 take the form of E [S1] = 2T and
unconditional expectations of Si; 8i > 1 are E [Si] = T 2T (T 1) :
Proof. Firstly we notice from equation (4.15) that due to symmetry all Si are
identically distributed for i > 1. Therefore we have
E [S1] + (T   1)E [S2] = 1; (4.19)
solving for E [S2] yields
E [S2] =
1  E [S1   S2]
T
; (4.20)
which we can rewrite using the result of lemma (4.2.6) as
E [Si] = E [S2] =
T   2
T (T   1) : (4.21)
The results from lemmas 4.2.6 and 4.2.7 provide intuition on why bounded
memory learning can be seen as a special case of the CG learning. Firstly, we can
clearly see, that after the rst observation each of the Si;t for any length of T has
the same unconditional expectation (which can be interpreted as a weight) which
falls in the interval between 0 and 1. And this is the same interval where gain
123
parameter  is dened in the case of CG learning. Therefore, parameters Si;t in
the loose sense could also be interpreted as the dynamic weights which depend on
the length of memory T . In the latter parts of the paper we will illustrate this
point more explicitly.
Proposition 4.2.8 Eigenvalues of the matrix E [Mt] are smaller than 1 in mod-
ulus.
Proof. See appendix, section 4.5.6.
Proposition 4.2.9 E [M0;t 
M0;t] is a stochastic matrix.
Proof. It follows immediately from Proposition 4.2.5. Firstly, as
P
i=1;T
Si;t = 1; we
have M0;t  e = e; where e is a column vector of 1s. Secondly, we use the mixed-
product property rule (M0;t  e) 
 (M0;t  e) = (M0;t 
M0;t) (e
 e) : Therefore
(M0;t 
M0;t) (e
 e) = (e
 e) ; and thus E [M0;t 
M0;t] (e
 e) = (e
 e) : Finally,
all elements of the matrix E [M0;t 
M0;t] are from the set fESi;t;ESi;tSj;t; 1; 0g and
therefore they are non-negative.
Proposition 4.2.10 All eigenvalues of matrix E [Mt 
Mt] are strictly smaller
than 1 in their absolute value.
Proof. In the appendix we proved that (E [Mt 
Mt])T < (E [M0;t 
M0;t])T (see
Lemma 4.5.4). We have also shown that matrix (E [Mt 
Mt])T is strictly positive
(see Lemma 4.5.3). As E [M0;t 
M0;t] is a stochastic matrix (E [M0;t 
M0;t])T
is also a stochastic matrix, and all its eigenvalues are not bigger than 1 in ab-
solute value. Therefore we can apply PerronFrobenius theorem to deduce that
the spectral radius of (E [Mt 
Mt])T is smaller or equal to .
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4.2.5 Cycles in the Bounded Memory Learning
In this section we are going to use the Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT) to
measure the cyclicality of the actual price pt occurring when agents are learning
using the bounded memory algorithm in the cobweb model setting.
It is known that the DFT of a discrete sequence a = [a0; an; ::an 1] is another
discrete sequence b = [b0; bk; ::bk 1] given by
bk =
1p
n
n 1X
j=0
aje
i 2
n
jk; (4.22)
where aj is the original sequence, bk denotes the transformed series and j; k and
n are indices of sequences. By using Eulers formula cos'+ i sin' = ei' where '
is an angle given in radians we can see that by applying the above expression we
will represent the sequence as a sum of sine and cosine functions. Hence we can
measure the cyclicality of the sequence.
Furthermore, we can relate the cycles to the memory length. To do that we
apply DFT (4.22) to the pt generated using the cobweb model. We analyze two
extreme cases: one is very short memory, T = 10, the other one is very long
memory, T = 4900 and the model horizon is 5000 periods. We simulated the model
with each window length for 5000 times using di¤erent realizations of shocks and
exogenous variable wt. Then we applied formula (4.22) to the time series and and
took the mean. Lastly, we plotted the results as shown in the gure below.
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Figure 4.1. Cycles p for Short and Long Memory
On the X axis we show the length of period and on the Y axis we depict the
power, f , of the cycle which is obtained by this formula
fi = x
2
i + y
2
i ; (4.23)
where i = 1; ::; n
2
and n is the length of the sequence, xi and yi (obtained by
substituting Eulers formula into DFT) denote the real and imaginary parts of
bk obtained from DFT. As we can see from the gure, short memory (red line)
causes much shorter cycles (red line is above the black one for a small length of a
period) and long memory T results in long cycles (black line is above the red one
for long periods). To investigate the relation between the length of cycles and the
length of memory T we compute DFT for various lengths of memory shown on the
X axis in the gure below. To produce gure 4.2 we have simulated the cobweb
model with bounded memory and time horizon 5000 for 1000 times using di¤erent
length of memory in the interval 200; 4200 with the step size 200:
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Figure 4.2. Power of Cycles with Bounded Memory
As we can see, the relation between the strength of cycles and the memory
length seems to be a little ambiguous. On the one hand, we can see that cycles
look to become less strong as we increase memory, on the other hand it is clear
that there are some uctuations and the trend of decreasing strength is not that
clear. However, as we increase memory T the strength of cycles tend to be very
similar (for instance, cycles for T = 3500 and T = 3700 are almost the same) and
for short memory the di¤erences between cycles is huge (for example, T = 1200
and T = 1400 cycles are very di¤erent).
The reasons why short memory causes strong cycles are: 1) The fact that it
uses only a small sample of observations to obtain OLS parameters and hence the
estimates are very inaccurate. 2) Paramaters change more sensitively when new
information is obtained when a small sample is used, which makes the price cycle
strength bigger. Therefore as we expand memory, cycles tend to decrease. It is
interesting to note that the cobweb model itself has instability in it because of the
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stochastic shock in the price equation, hence the strength of cycles is not tending
to zero.
To put it in a nutshell, we see that there is some connection between the length
of memory and the strength of cycles. While it is clear that shorter memory has
stronger cycles, as T increases this relation becomes less and less obvious.
4.2.6 Bounded Memory and Constant Gain Algorithm
In this section we compare learning in the cobweb model using constant gain (CG)
algorithm and bounded memory. We have simulated the model with each learning
type using the same realization of shocks and endogenous variable wt. Results are
provided in the gure below.
Figure 4.3. Bounded Memory and Constant Gain Algorithms
As we can see from the top panel gure 4.3 bounded memory learning algorithm
can generate smooth or volatile behavior of 2;t and 2;t (parameter estimates in
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OLS equation) dependent on the length of memory. That is, as noted previously,
the shorter memory length causes higher volatility than the short one.
In the bottom panel in gure 4.3 we show that constant gain algorithm can
generate very similar behavior dependent on the value of gain parameter : The
smaller the value of  is, the closer the CG algorithm is to OLS and the more
smooth the estimates are as could be seen from the gure 4.3.
4.3 Numerical Evaluation of Mean and Variance
In this section we evaluate numerically the mean and variance of both OLS para-
meters and price expectations pet . We use two di¤erent methods: explicit numerical
computation where we simply simulate the model and take the mean and variance
of the variables of interest and implicit numerical computation where we use the
indirect method to numerically evaluate the mean.
4.3.1 Explicit Numerical Computation
Mean
In this case we simulate the model shown in equations (4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13)
20.000 times with a time horizon of 5000 in each simulation. We also take 20.000
draws of wt and vt from the standard normal distribution. Then we calculate the
mean of price, expected price and parameters 2 and 2. It is worth noting that
we would get the same results for any size of memory T because we have shown
that the transition matrix has the same properties for any T . As expected, results
show that the mean of all variables and parameters is equal to the REE value. We
illustrate this nding in the gure below.
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Figure 4.4. Simulation of Mean (I)
It is clear that the mean is stationary around the REE values. Economically
speaking, uctuations in parameter values could be interpreted as cycles generated
by the bounded memory. Since agents have only a limited number of observations
to forecast the next period price, they always uctuate around REE but do not
converge to it. This property is also shared by the classical CG learning algorithm.
Variance
We use the same method to compute the variance of the variables. Results from
20.000 simulations are provided in the gure below. It is intuitive, that variance
decreases as the memory length increases because agents have more information
and hence their forecasts are more accurate. However, we can see that after T
reaches approximately 100 observations the variance does not decrease any more.
This is due to the fact that variance in our case could be split into two components:
one is stochastic and depends on the memory length T , the other is constant and
is caused by the shocks in the cobweb model itself. Hence we can see that after
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increasing memory length to 100 or more observations we almost eliminate the
change in variance which occurs due to small T .
Figure 4.5. Simulation of Variance
In terms of economics, this nding could be interpreted as a decreasing returns
to scale of information. It means that it is very benecial for the agent to increase
his memory as much as possible until it reaches some threshold value which in our
case is approximately 100. After that, increasing the length of memory does not
decrease variance any more.
4.3.2 Implicit Numerical Computation
In this section we use another way to compute the mean of the variables of interest
to conrm the results from the previous section. Recall, that our model has the
following form:
pt =  + 

TP
i=1
Sitpt i

+ wt 1 + vt; (4.24)
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where Si;t = 1T +
(wt 1 wt 1)(wt i wt 1)PT
i=1
[(wt i wt 1)2]
. Now we take unconditional expectations of
the equation above
E [p] =  + E [pe] ; (4.25)
where pe =
PT
i=1 Sitpt i.
Now we have to evaluate E [pe]. We can express it as
E [pe] = E
TP
i=1
[Si;tpt i] ; (4.26)
and2
E [pe] =
TP
i=1
[E [Si;t]E [p] + cov(Si;t; pt i)] : (4.27)
Since from proposition 4.2.5 we know that
PT
i=1 Si;t = 1 the above expression
simplies to
E [pe] =
TP
i=1
[E [p] + cov(Si;t; pt i)] : (4.28)
Therefore two equations, namely 4.28 and 4.25 can be used to solve for the variance
of price pt and expected price pet . We simulate this system numerically 20.000 times
with time horizon of 5000 in each observation. As in the previous case, we use the
fact that the mean of forecasts and pt does not depend on the memory length and
hence we arbitrarily pick T = 5 too. The result is provided in the gure below.
2To obtain expression for E [pe] we use the covariance formula: cov [X;Y ] = E [XY ]  
E [X]E [Y ]
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Figure 4.6. Simulation of Mean (II)
It is clear that mean is stationary around the RE equilibrium. Hence we have
conrmed by two di¤erent numerical computations that agents forecasts pet and
the actual price pt have a mean which is equal to the rational expectations value.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have investigated properties of econometric (OLS) learning with
bounded memory in the cobweb model setting. We have shown that the eigenvalues
of the transition matrix lie within the unit circle for any length of memory T:
Furthermore, we have sketched the proof of stationarity of price pt. In addition,
using computational techniques we nd that price and both OLS estimates have
the mean which is the same as REE.
Secondly, we nd that cycles in our algorithm occur as a result of bounded
memory. In this sense bounded memory learning could be seen as a special case of
Constant Gain learning where instability results from the constant gain parameter
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.
Thirdly, there is a relation between the length of memory and the strength
of cycles occurring in the actual price pt. Whilst it is clear that shorter memory
results in stronger cycles, as memory length increases the strength of cycles seems
to be decreasing.
Lastly, we have shown that there is a negative relationship between the variance
of forecasts and parameter estimates and the length of memory. That is, shorter
memory implies greater variance of forecasts and estimates. The reason for this
is intuitive. If agents have short memory, they are unable to compute accurate
forecasts of price and thus the variance increases. In the case of long memory,
forecasts are much more accurate and thus the variance is lower.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Proof of proposition 4.2.1
Combining (4.10), (4.11), (4.12), (4.13) we get
pt = +
 
pt 1 + (wt 1   wt 1)
PT
t=1

(wt i   wt 1)(pt i   pt 1)
PT
t=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
!
+ wt 1+vt:
(4.29)
Let us simplify it and compute Si :
pet = pt 1 + (wt 1   wt 1)
PT
i=1

(wt i   wt 1)(pt i   pt 1)
PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
; (4.30)
= pt 1
 
1  (wt 1   wt 1)
PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)]PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
!
+ (wt 1   wt 1)
PT
i=1(wt i   wt 1)pt iPT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
: (4.31)
Note that
PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)] = 0. Therefore it simplies further to:
pet =
TP
i=1
1
T
pt i + (wt 1   wt 1)
PT
i=1(wt i   wt 1)pt iPT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
(4.32)
=
TP
i=1
pt i
"
1
T
+
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt i   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
#
: (4.33)
Hence
Si =
1
T
+
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt i   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
:
4.5.2 Proof of E [Si;t] > 0
Now we wish to prove that E [Si] > 0: First, we see that S1 > 0 as it is a sum
of squares. However other coe¢ cients can take both positive and negative values.
We will use permutation trick to prove that E [Si] is positive. Recall, that wt is
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i:i:d. Now consider a possible realization of w such that
(wt 1 = x1; :::wt T = xT ) : (4.34)
Then for any permutation  the following realization is equally possible
Pr
 
wt 1 = x(1); :::wt T = x(T )

= Pr (wt 1 = x1; :::wt T = xT ) : (4.35)
To proceed with the proof, we will split the space of events between those gener-
ated by the one set and all of its possible permutations. Then we will show that
expectations is positive on every such set.
We consider a set X = fx1::::xTg; and dene x =
PT
i=1
1
T
xi as its mean. Lets
compute a sum
P
(x) Si over all the permutations of set X. The formal denition
of this sum is
P
(X)
f(wt 1; ::::wt T ) =
P
wt 12X
266664
P
wt 22Xnwt 1264 Pwt 32Xnwt 1nwt 2 :::hP
wt T2Xnwt 1nwt 2n::::nwt T+1(wt 1; :::wt T )
i
375
377775 :
(4.36)
For set X , wt 1 = x
P
(x)
Si =
P
(x)
"
1
T
+
(wt 1   x) (wt i   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
#
=
T !
T
+ (T   2)! P
wt 12X
 
(wt 1   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
TP
wt i2Xnwt 1
[(wt i   x)]
!
;(4.37)
we use the fact that
PT
wt i2Xnwt 1 [(wt i   x)] =
hPT
wt i2(wt i   x)
i
 (wt 1 x) =
 (wt 1   x):
Therefore
T !
T
+ (T   2)! P
wt i2X
 
(wt 1   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
TP
wt i2Xnwt 1
[(wt i   x)]
!
=
T !
T
  (T   2)! P
wt i2X
"
(wt 1   x)2PT
i=1(wt i   x)2
#
=
T !
T
  (T   2)! = (T   2)(T   2)! > 0:
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4.5.3 Proof of E [SiS1] > 0
Recall:
SiS1 =
"
1
T
+
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt i   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
#"
1
T
+
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt 1   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
#
:
(4.38)
As before, we will use permutations to compute conditional expectations.
P
(x)
SiS1 =
P
(x)
1
T 2
+
1
T
P
(x)
(wt 1   wt 1)2PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
+
1
T
P
(x)
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt i   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
+
P
(x)
(wt 1   wt 1)3 (wt i   wt 1)hPT
i=1(wt i   wt 1)2
i2 ;
we will compute each component of the sum separately. The rst component
is:
P
(x)
1
T 2
=
(T   1)!
T
: (4.39)
The second component is:
P
(x)
1
T
(wt 1   wt 1)2PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
=
(T   1)!
T
: (4.40)
The third component is a little more complex:
P
(x)
1
T
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt i   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
=
(T   2)!
T
P
wt i2X
 
(wt 1   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
TP
wt i2Xnwt 1
(wt i   x)
!
=  (T   2)!
T
P
wt i2X
 
(wt 1   x)2PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
!
=  (T   2)!
T
: (4.41)
Finally, we compute the last and the most complex component:
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P
(x)
(wt 1   x)3 (wt i   x)hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2
= (T   2)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)3hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 TP
wt i2Xnwt 1
(wt i   x)
1CA
=   (T   2)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)4hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2
1CA
=   (T   2)!
PT
i=1 (wt 1   x)4hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 : (4.42)
The total sum becomes
P
(x)
SiS1 =
2 (T   1)!
T
  (T   2)!
T
  (T   2)!
PT
i=1 (wt 1   x)4PT
i=1(wt i   x)2
=
(T   2)!
T
264T   3 + T
hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2
 PTi=1 (wt 1   x)4hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2
375 > 0:(4.43)
4.5.4 Proof of E [SiSj] > 0
Recall:
SiSj =
"
1
T
+
(wt 1   x) (wt i   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
#"
1
T
+
(wt 1   wt 1) (wt J   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
#
: (4.44)
Like in the previous proof, we will use permutations to compute conditional
expectations.
P
(x)
SiSj =
P
(x)
1
T 2
+
P
(x)
1
T
(wt 1   x) (wt i   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
+
P
(x)
1
T
(wt 1   x) (wt j   x)PT
i=1 [(wt i   x)2]
+
P
(x)
(wt 1   x)2 (wt i   x)(wt j   x)hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 : (4.45)
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We have already computed the rst 3 components of the sum in (4.39) and
(4.42). Now we will compute the last component
P
(x)
(wt 1   x)2 (wt i   x)(wt i   x)hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 (4.46a)
= (T   3)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)2hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 P
wt i2Xnwt 1
(wt i   x)
" P
wt j2Xnwt 1nwt i
(wt j   x)
#1CA :
To proceed we use
P
wt j2Xnwt 1nwt i
(wt j   x) =
" P
wt j2X
(wt j   x)
#
  (wt i   x)  (wt 1   x)
=   [(wt i   x) + (wt 1   x)] (4.47)
Therefore (4.46a) is the same as
  (T   3)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)2hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 P
wt i2Xnwt 1
(wt i   x) [(wt i   x) + (wt 1   x)]
1CA
=   (T   3)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)2hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 P
wt i2Xnwt 1
(wt i   x)2
1CA
  (T   3)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)3hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2 P
wt i2Xnwt 1
(wt i   x)
1CA
=   (T   3)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)2hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2
" P
wt i2X
(wt i   x)2   (wt 1   x)2
#1CA
+ (T   3)! P
wt i2X
0B@ (wt 1   x)4hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2
1CA : (4.48)
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Hence the total sum isP
(x)
SiSj =
(T   1)!
T
  2 (T   2)!
T
  (T   3)! + (T   3)! 2
PT
i=1 (wt 1   x)4hPT
i=1(wt i   wt 1)2
i2
=
(T   3)!
T
264(T   3)(T   2)  T + T 2PTi=1 (wt i   x)4hPT
i=1(wt i   x)2
i2
375 >< 0:
Now we need two statements. The rst one is
P
(x) S2S3 = 0;for T = 3:We
will prove it in lemma 4.5.1. Finally we will use lemma 4.5.2 to complete the proof
for T > 3:
Lemma 4.5.1 For any x1; x2; x3 2
P3
i=1 (xi   x)4 =
P3
i=1(xi   x)2
2
Proof. It can be proved by direct multiplication and opening all the brackets.
Lemma 4.5.2 For any x1; x2; xT ; T > 3
((T   3)(T   2)  T )

TP
i=1
(xi   x)2
2
+ 2T
3P
i=1
(xi   x)4 > 0 (4.49)
Expression 4.49 can be written as the quadratic form Y TQY; where Y =0BBBB@
(x1   x)2
:::
(xT   x)2
1CCCCA, Q =
0BBBBBBB@
d z z z
z d z z
z z d z
z z z d
1CCCCCCCA
and
d = (T   3)(T   2)  T + 2T; (4.50)
z = (T   3)(T   2)  T: (4.51)
This quadratic form Q has only two eigenvalues,
1 = d  z = 2T > 0; (4.52)
2 = (T   1)z + d = Tz + 2T = T (z + 2); (4.53)
= T (T 2   6T + 8): (4.54)
2 is positive and increasing for T  4:
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4.5.5 Proof of lemma 4.2.6
It is easy to see that by denition (4.15)
S1   S2 = (wt 1   wt 2) (wt 1   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
: (4.55)
To compute the expected value we will split all the possible realizations of w into
subsets, generated by permutations. Let X be the set of realizations and (X) set
of all the possible permutations over T of set X. Furthermore let p(X) = Pr(w 2
X). Then p((X)) = T !p(X): Unconditional expectations of E [S1   S2] could be
computed as
E [S1   S2] =
Z
(S1(w)  S2(w)) dp (w) (4.56)
=
Z
dp((X))
1
T !
" P
w2(X)
(S1(w)  S2(w))
#
: (4.57)
Now we consider set X and sum up over all the possible permutations
P
w2(X)
(S1   S2) =
P
(X)
(wt 1   wt 2)wt 1PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
= (T   1)! P
wt 1
w2t 1PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
 (T   2)! P
wt 1
wt 1PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
P
wt 2 6=wt 1
wt 2
= (T   1)! P
wt 1
w2t 1PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
 (T   2)! P
wt 1
wt 1PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
(Twt 1   wt 1) :(4.58)
The above expression could be simplied to
P
w2(X)
(S1   S2) = [T (T   2)!]
P
wt 1
w2t 1   wt 1wt 1PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2]
: (4.59)
Now we will show that
P
wt 1

w2t 1   wt 1wt 1

=
PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)2] : Suppose
that the realization of w is (x1; x2; :::; xT ), then, using permutations we can show
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that
P
wt 1

w2t 1   wt 1wt 1

=
TP
i=1

x2i   xix

=
TP
i=1

x2i   2xix+ xix

=
TP
i=1

x2i   2xix

+
TP
i=1
xix
=
TP
i=1

x2i   2xix

+ Tx2 =
TP
i=1

x2i   2xix+ x2

=
TP
i=1
[xi   x]2 =
TP
i=1
[wt i   wt 1]2 : (4.60)
Hence we know that
P
wt 1
w2t 1 wt 1wt 1PT
i=1
[(wt i wt 1)2]
= 1. Then computing conditional
expectations yields
E jw2(X) (S1   S2) = 1
T !
" P
w2(X)
(S1(w)  S2(w))
#
= [T (T   2)!] 1
T !
=
1
T   1 :
(4.61)
Lastly, we know that unconditional expectations will be the same since
Z
dp((X)) =
1:
4.5.6 Spectral radius of E [Mt 
Mt]
As it is sketched above, to accomplish the proof we need some preliminary steps.
First we will prove that matrix E [Mt;0 
Mt;0] is irreducible. In particular we will
show that all elements of matrix (E [Mt0 
Mt0])T are strictly positive
Lemma 4.5.3 All elements of matrix (E [Mt 
Mt])T are strictly positive.
Proof. We will consider the rst case when T > 4: Then we know that E [Si;tSj;t]
are strictly positive and therefore there exists a positive number z; such that z2 <
min(2E [Si;tSj;t] ; E [Si]):Consider matrix Z with elements dened as following
Z1;j = z > 0; for any j; (4.62)
Zi;i 1 = 1; if i > 2; (4.63)
Zij = 0 otherwise. (4.64)
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Z =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
z z ::: z z
1 0 ::: 0 0
0 1 ::: 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
(4.65)
All the elements of matrix Z are non-negative and (Z 
 Z)i;j  (E [Mt;0 
Mt;0])i;j:
Therefore, (Z
Z)T 6 (E [Mt;0 
Mt;0])T : Because (Z
Z)T = ZT 
ZT , it would
be su¢ cient to show that all elements of ZT are strictly positive. Matrix Z can
be represented as a sum of shift matrix S and the a matrix with positive elements
on its rst row, Z1:
Z1 =
0BBBBBBB@
z z ::: z
0 0 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 0
1CCCCCCCA
(4.66)
:
S =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 ::: 0 0
1 0 ::: 0 0
0 1 ::: 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
; (4.67)
By induction we can prove that Zm1 =
0BBBBBBB@
zm zm ::: zm
0 0 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 0
1CCCCCCCA
. It is also easy to
verify that SkZT k1 is a matrix which has z
T K as its (k+1; j) element. Therefore,
we have proven that all elements of ZT 1 are positive since ZT = (S + Z1)
T X
k=0;T 1
SkZT k1 > 0 .
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We proved the lemma for T > 3. For T = 3 it is also true, we can easily verify it
by computing Z3:
Lemma 4.5.4 Any element of (E [Mt 
Mt])T is smaller than (E [M0;t 
M0;t])T
Proof. As before we present matrix E [M0;t 
M0;t] as a sum of two matrices
E [M0;t 
M0;t] = S 
 S +M1; (4.68)
where S is a shift matrix dened in (4.67). Then
E(Mt 
Mt)) = S 
 S + (B 
B)M1; (4.69)
where (B 
B)M1  M1: It is easy to show that
E [Mt 
Mt]K = Sk 
 Sk +Qk ( (B 
B)M1)
where Q ( (B 
B)M1) is a sum of products of the elements ( (B 
B)M1) and 
Sk 
 Sk ; such that ((B 
B)M1) comes to it at least once. For example,
Q1 = (B 
B)M1: And it is easy to compute a recursive formula for Qk+1
Qk+1 = (B
B)M1
 
Sk 
 Sk+(S 
 S)Qk ( (B 
B)M1)+(B
B)M1Qk ( (B 
B)M1) :
(4.70)
Moreover, it is also true thatE [M0;t 
M0;t]K = Sk
Sk+Qk ( M1) :As ((B 
B)M1) 
M1; it follows that
Qk ( (B 
B)M1)  QK ( M1)E [Mt 
Mt]T
= ST 
 ST +Qk ( (B 
B)M1)  ST 
 ST + QT ( M1) :
However, ST is a shift matrix and therefore, ST = NULL: Hence we proved that
E [Mt 
Mt]T = Qk ( (B 
B)M1)  QT ( M1) (4.71)
= QT ( M1) (E [M0;t 
M0;t])T : (4.72)
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Spectral Radius of Matrix E [Mt]
We wish to prove that all eigenvalue of matrix E [M ] are smaller than one. That
matrix is
E [M ] = BE [M0] =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
ES1t ES2t ::: EST 1t ESTt
1 0 ::: 0 0
0 1 ::: 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
:
Consider a characteristic polynomial:
det(E [Mt]  xI) = det
0BBBBBBBBBB@
ES1   x ES2 ::: EST 1 EST
1  x ::: 0 0
0 1 ::: 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 1  x
1CCCCCCCCCCA
det(E [Mt]  xI) = ( x)T + E

S1t( x)T 1
  E S2t( x)T 2
+E

S3t( x)T 3

+ :::( 1)k+1E Skt( x)T k :::::( 1)T+1E [STt] = 0 (4.73)
Q(x) = ( 1)Tdet(Mt xI) = xT E

S1tx
n 1 E S2txn 2+::: E SktxT k ::::: E [STt]
(4.74)
We will prove that this polynomial does not have any roots higher than or equal
than 1 in its absolute value. Consider x, such that jxj  1,then jxj k 6 1.Q(x)xT
 = 1   TP
i=1
E

Si;tx
 i  1  TP
i=1
E
h
Si;t jzj i
i
 1 
TP
i=1
E [Si;t] = 1 
(4.75)
Therefore, z can not be an eigenvalue of E [M ] as it is not a root of its characteristic
polynomial.
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Proof of lemma 4.2.2
Let us dene ki;t as
ki;t =
(wt i   wt 1)PT
i=1 [(wt i   wt 1)]
 1
2
; (4.76)
then according to (4.15)
Si;t =
1
T
+ ki;tk1;t; (4.77)
where ki;t can be any number with the following restrictions
TP
i=1
ki;t = 0; (4.78)
TP
i=1
k2i;t = 1: (4.79)
Now we can compute S2i;t:
TP
i=1
S2i;t =
TP
i=1

1
T
+ ki;tk1;t
2
=
1
T
+ k21;t: (4.80)
Lets maximize (4.80) subject to constraints (4.78) and (4.79). The Lagrangian is
max
ki
L =
1
T
+ k21   0
TP
i=1
ki   1

TP
i=1
k2i   1

(4.81)
The rst order conditions imply
@L
@k1
= 2k1   0   21k1 = 0; (4.82)
@L
@ki
=  0   21ki = 0; (4.83)
summing up all FOC and combining it with (4.78), we obtain 0 = 2k1T : Sim-
ilarly
PT
i=1
@L
@ki
ki = 2k
2
1   21 = 0; and implies 1 = k21: Finally, from (4.82), we
obtain
k1

1  1
T
  k21

= 0;
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which implies that k21 = 1   1T at its maximum ( and k1 = 0 at its minimum).
Therefore
TP
i=1
S2i;t =
1
T
+ k21t 
1
T
+

1  1
T

= 1 (4.84)
Proof of proposition 4.2.3
For any memory length T , there exist a natural number nT and boundary BT such
that for any n > nT ; every elements of the product of n matrices is bounded by
BT
n :  Y
i=1;n
(Mt i)

ij
< BT
n: (4.85)
To prove this statement we will represent matrix Mt as follows:
Mt = Zt + S (4.86)
where we dene Zt as
Zt =
0BBBBBBB@
S1;t S2;t ::: ST 1;t
0 0 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 0
1CCCCCCCA
; (4.87)
and S is the shift matrix
S =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 ::: 0 0
1 0 ::: 0 0
0 1 ::: 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
: (4.88)
We claim that any matrix X, multiplied by B row of BX; is zero. Moreover
is the rst k rows of X are zeros, than the rst of k + 1 row of BX are zeroes as
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well. Lets compute the product:
Y
i=1;n
(Mt i) = (Zt 1 + S) (Zt 2 + S) :::: (Zt n + S) (4.89)
To compute the operation we need to sum up the matrix products of length n
consisting of Z and S. However, if S appears more than T   1 times, the product
is zero. Therefore we can restrict our attention only to those cases which will
have S less than T times. The number of products with S being exactly on k
places is n!=k!=(n   k)! and the total number of non-zero products is less than
n!=((T   1)!(n  T + 1)!)  (T   1):
Moreover we can claim that every product is a matrix with elements less than
(z)n T ; where z = max
i
jSi;tj  1:Therefore, every element of
[(Zt 1 + S) (Zt 2 + S) :::: (Zt n + S)]ij <
n!
(T   2)!(n  T + 1)!
n T < nTn T :
Consider the sequence fang ; where
an = n
Tn T
then
an+1
an
=

n+ 1
n
T

Let e 2 (; 1) then we can nd n(e; T; ); such that for any n > n;
an+1
an
=

n+ 1
n
T
 < e; (4.90)
in that case for any k
an+k < ekan = eknTn T : (4.91)
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis we have looked at the two broad topics in macroeconomics: mon-
etary policy design and learning.
In the second chapter we considered a standard New-Keynesian model with
sticky prices, collateralized borrowing as in Iacoviello (2005) and interest rate at
the ZLB. We have investigated dynamic properties of the economy under negative
nancial and positive productivity shocks. The results suggests that under the
presence of nancial market shock the government could stabilize the economy by
implementing transfers according to the rule that takes into account households
borrowing. If interest rate is not at the ZLB and has some small positive value,
economy could be stabilized by reducing it. When the productivity shock occurs,
central bank cannot keep the economy at the steady state any more in terms of
ination and output deviations. However, he could stabilize the price of collateral
by setting the transfers rule to zero. We also nd that reaction to households
borrowing in the policy rules (interest rate and transfers) is optimal because it
yields the highest value of the welfare measure.
In the third chapter we investigated the relation between rms borrowing and
unemployment in the framework of the standard new Keynesian model with rms
borrowing market and search and matching frictions. Our results show that in the
case of a negative nancial and a positive productivity shocks Taylor-type policy
rule which reacts on ination and unemployment is the closest one to the optimal
policy in terms of the welfare measure. This nding is consistent with the existing
literature (for instance, Faia (2008) or Thomas (2008)). Furthermore, we nd that
the sign of the unemployment reaction parameter in the policy rule depends on
the value of workers bargaining power.
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In the last chapter of thesis we have investigated properties of the bounded
memory learning algorithm using the classical cobweb model. We have sketched
the analytical proof for the stationarity of price for any length of memory T .
Furthermore, by making use of the computational techniques we found that mean
and variance of the parameter estimates and price have the same mean as rational
expectations values. However, we are still working on the analytical proof of this
property. In addition, we discovered that bounded memory causes cycles in agents
forecasts. If agents have long memory, then cycles in their forecasts are tend to
be longer than in the case of a short memory. This nding also implies, that
there exists some threshold value of memory length T after which adding more
observation to the sample does not improve the accuracy of forecast.
In terms of future research, rstly, we would like to nalize the analytical proof
of stationarity of bounded memory learning. Secondly, we would like to try to
apply our learning algorithm for the analysis of the Central Bank policy, in partic-
ular, Bank of England. We are motivated by the success of Sargent, Williams and
Zha (2004) who applied very similar model (with Kalman lter learning instead
of bounded memory) to investigate FEDs policy towards ination and unemploy-
ment. The reason why we believe that bounded memory algorithm could be useful
in this case is the fact that central planner updates his policy based on the recent
economic performance. Lastly, once the properties of bounded memory learning
algorithm are known, it would be very interesting to look at the economy where
agents have di¤erent memory lengths because this might give a suggestion of an op-
timal (in terms of mean square error, for instance) memory length or a convergence
to multiple equilibria that may depend on the calibration of the model.
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